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Abstract 
This paper investigates whether investors react rationally to the announcements of 
profit warnings in the Norwegian stock market by examining abnormal returns, 
information leakage and post-announcement drift. A classification of the warnings 
has been made to analyze whether the information content inherent in 
quantitative- and qualitative warnings has an effect on the market reaction. The 
sample includes 184 profit warnings from 2005 to 2012, where 144 of them are 
quantitative and 40 qualitative. The mean price reaction to the profit warnings on 
the announcement day was -5.25% and we report a mean CAR of -6.36% in the 
event window [-1, +1]. Contrary to many existing studies, this paper provides 
evidence of a greater market reaction to quantitative warnings than qualitative. 
This disparity decreases somewhat over time as qualitative warnings experience a 
significant one-day delayed market reaction of CAAR equal to -2.1%. 
Distinguishing between positive and negative disclosures reveals that bad news 
result in a greater market reaction than good news. 
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1. Introduction 
Traditional studies on earnings announcements and market efficiency have 
focused on the relationship between earnings information and stock prices, while 
studies on profit warnings have been less explored. Expectation about future cash 
flows is one of the main drivers of a company’s share price; hence, rational 
investors should incorporate information revealed in profit warnings into new 
estimates of market values. Because profit warnings are pure information events 
and the market reaction upon these types of announcements is large, it is an 
opportunity to test whether markets are efficient and explore the information 
content in warnings. This paper examines profit warnings disclosed by Norwegian 
listed companies and test for abnormal returns ex-ante and ex-post. An event 
study on profit warnings disclosed in the period 01.01.2005 until 31.12.2012 is 
conducted to scrutinize the speed of adjustment to new information and the scope 
of the market reaction.  
 
Bulkley and Herrerias (2005) categorized profit warnings into two different 
classes, an approach which is pursued and implemented in this thesis. They 
distinguished between new information which included earnings forecasts 
(quantitative) and new information that only included guidance for which 
direction earnings would deviate from previous forecasts (qualitative). This 
method provides insight about the content in the profit warnings and how different 
levels of precision in the disclosed information affect stock returns. Based on a 
genuine interest for this topic, the following research question has been 
developed:  
 
To what extent does the Norwegian stock market react to different types of profit 
warnings and how fast does the market adjust to the new information?  
 
Although some research on profit warnings in Norway exists (Svendsen 2009; 
Larsen and Jacobsen 2005; Hjelmeseth, Kleppan, and Nysveen 2002), it is a 
relatively unexplored subject given that profit warnings were not regulated until 
1999. Listed companies became obliged to notify their shareholders when they 
were aware of significant deviations from previous earnings statements (Oslo 
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Stock Exchange 1999). This law was later repealed and profit warnings are now 
regulated by the general rule about disclosure of inside information (Oslo Stock 
Exchange 2005 (1); Oslo Stock Exchange 2005 (2)). An extract of the rules 
regarding information disclosure can be found in Appendix 1. The number of 
Norwegian studies that examines the degree of disclosed information and how it 
affects share price movements is limited. Our thesis contributes with new data, 
which include an assessment of market efficiency in a period of financial turmoil. 
In contrast to the majority of existing research based on Norwegian data, this 
study includes both positive and negative warnings, which makes it possible to 
test whether the market react differently to good and bad news.  
1.1 Structure 
This paper is structured into seven main sections, including this section where the 
hypotheses are being presented. The second section covers relevant background 
information concerning profit warnings and theory about market efficiency. Profit 
warnings are defined and the purpose of these statements is clarified. The 
rationale behind an efficient market and its implication on security prices is also 
enlightened in this section. The third section reviews published literature and 
research on topics relevant for this master thesis. Of special importance is the 
article: “Does the Precision of News Affect Market Underreaction” by Bulkley 
and Herrerias (2005), due to the fact that we investigate some of the same subjects 
and apply similar methods as the authors of that paper. Furthermore, the third 
section is divided into four subsections, namely: (1) event studies, (2) profit 
warnings and market efficiency, (3) information leakage and (4) post-earnings-
announcement price drift. The fourth section describes the methodology applied in 
the study and reasoning behind the selection of asset pricing model, besides 
addressing the length of the event window and statistical- and econometric 
assumptions. We provide a description of the data and how it is extracted in 
section five. The results are presented and interpreted in the sixth section. We will 
in this section elaborate on the impact the results have on the Norwegian stock 
market. The last section concludes and summarize, before the weaknesses with 
this study and suggestions for future research are proposed.  
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1.2 Hypothesis Testing 
In order to test whether the Norwegian stock market respond in accordance with 
the efficient market hypothesis, four different hypotheses are presented. The 
implications of the various hypothesis-tests are also discussed briefly. 
HA1: There are abnormal returns on the announcement date. 
When information which deviates from forecasts is released, rational investors are 
expected to act on the new information. It is therefore presumed that evidence of 
abnormal returns will be found at the announcement date. A rejection of the first 
null-hypothesis indicates that the market is not strong-form efficient.  
HA2: There is information leakage prior to the announcement date. 
The second hypothesis focuses on when the new information is released to the 
market. In a perfect efficient stock market, news is perceived by all investors 
simultaneously and the reaction to a profit warning causes an immediate change in 
the security price. A rejection of the second null-hypothesis indicates that some 
investors gain access to the information earlier than others, or that they interpret 
and react quicker than the rest of the market. A violation of this null-hypothesis 
could be a result of an inefficient market.  
HA3: There are abnormal returns in the stock market in the days following a 
profit warning. 
If investors can achieve systematic abnormal returns through trading strategies 
after the announcement date, then the market is not semi-strong efficient. 
Significant evidence of abnormal returns following an event is called post-
announcement drift and could be both positive and negative. A rejection of the 
third null-hypothesis is either due to an underreaction or an overreaction in the 
stock market.  
HA4: The degree of information disclosure impacts the magnitude of the 
abnormal returns. 
The last hypothesis is about the information content in profit warnings, which is 
explored by examining the market reaction to quantitative and qualitative 
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warnings. If differences are detected, it is expected that quantitative warnings 
leads to a lower reaction in the stock market than qualitative. The basis for this 
assertion is that prior studies have found that investors tend to overract to 
qualitative profit warnings, and that share prices adjust to equilibrium faster when 
forecasts are provided, due to the increased knowledge among shareholders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
~The Information Content in Profit Warnings and the Implications for Market Rationality~ 
Page 5 
2. Background Information 
This section provides an overview of theory related to the research question. The 
analysis performed in this paper is anchored in these models and publications. The 
first part define and describe profit warnings, the subsequent section cover 
different forms of market efficiency, and we end the background information with 
a discussion about difficulties with tests of market efficiency and statistical 
properties of abnormal returns. 
2.1 Profit Warnings 
Profit warnings are statements proclaimed by a firm due to unexpected changes in 
the company’s financial results. These announcements are published to inform 
investors and stakeholders about the firm’s operating performance and to alert 
about deviations from forecasted results or market expectations. Bulkley and 
Herrerias (2004) define a profit warning as an unexpected corporate 
announcement which declares that future earnings will decrease below current 
expectations. Corporations often disclose profit warnings based upon revised 
management projections, but the companies are also inclined to disclose a 
statement if they are aware of differing market expectations regarding the future 
performance of the company. Profit warnings include unanticipated information 
and a proxy for market expectations is therefore required to measure the extent of 
the surprise. Prevailing predictions about future profitability determine whether a 
profit warning include estimates above or below market expectations. 
 
The content and scope of the profit warnings varies widely. Some warnings only 
state that performance will be lower or better than expected, while other warnings 
provide more detailed and accurate forecasts. Profit warnings are similar to 
earnings announcements in the way that the purpose of the announcement is to 
disclose information, but profit warnings are generally considered to be less 
anticipated and thereby cause larger fluctuations in stock prices (Church and 
Donker 2010). A detailed example of a profit warning disclosed through 
NewsWeb can be found in Appendix 2, while the entire list of the classified 
warnings is presented in Appendix 3.  
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2.2 Market Efficiency  
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is the notion that security prices reflect all 
available information and the market price is considered to be an unbiased 
estimate of the true value of the investment (Fama 1965). The theory concerning 
market efficiency is consistent with Maurice Kendall’s research, which discovered 
that stock prices seemed to follow a random walk (Kendall 1953). The concept 
that stock prices follow a random walk implies that price changes are independent 
of each other and that no systematic patterns exist (Brealey, Myers, and Allen 
2008).  If systematic patterns are detected, investors would exploit them and 
thereby eliminate them through extensive trading. Samuelson argued in the 
following way: “In competitive markets there is a buyer for every seller. If one 
could be sure that a price would rise, it would have already risen” (Samuelson 
1965, 41). If the EMH is valid then future market prices should be unpredictable 
and only unexpected news will affect the price level. Deviations from market 
efficiency could lead to inefficient resource allocation; a cost borne by all citizens 
in a society (Mendes 2010). 
 
Eugene Fama (1970) defined three forms of market efficiency and his work has 
been prevalent thereafter (Bodie, Kane, and Markus 2011): 
 The Weak form assumes that current stock prices reflect all information 
that can be derived from historical prices and by examining market trading 
data. The implication is that trading strategies based on chartism and trend 
analysis is not profitable. 
 The Semi-strong form defines a market as efficient if all public available 
information is incorporated into the stock price. Persistent anomalies and 
predictions of future abnormal returns are violations of the semi-strong 
form of the efficient market hypothesis.  
 The Strong form states that prices reflect all relevant information, even 
including inside information. This form is extreme and implies full 
transparency within the market, as no company insiders can pre-empt the 
market or take advantage of information asymmetries.  
The semi-strong form of the EMH is of particular interest when examining the 
degree of market efficiency related to profit warnings announcements. If the 
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market is semi-strong efficient, then market prices will adjust immediately after 
the announcement in response to the new information and no post-announcement 
price drift will occur. The stock price will experience a jump to the new price 
level and investors have limited opportunity to act faster than the rest of the 
market. Patell and Wolfson (1984) find that the bulk of the market response to 
dividend or earnings announcements occurs within ten minutes after the notice. 
The innovations of electronic trading and online communication in the last 
decades have contributed to the increased speed of adjustment. 
 
Post-announcement price drift is the tendency for a stock’s cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) to drift in one direction in a longer period after the announcement 
(Bernard 1993). If the price continues to fall during the period following a 
negative warning it could be interpreted as an underreaction, while a partial 
reversal of the initial movement indicates that the market has overreacted to the 
announcement. A stock price reversal does not necessarily entail an overreaction, 
as it may signalize that market risk premium varies over time and be a rational 
response to changes in discount rates (Bodie, Kane, and Marcus 2011). Figure 1 
depicts delayed market response (underreaction) and overreaction to bad news 
graphically, while the blue line is the efficient market reaction under the semi-
strong form. 
 
Figure 1: Semi-strong form, Over- and Underreaction  
 
 
~The Information Content in Profit Warnings and the Implications for Market Rationality~ 
Page 8 
If investors gained access to information at different times and traded accordingly, 
it could be evidence against market efficiency. Security prices would adjust prior 
to the announcement due to information leakage in the market. On the other hand 
it could also reflect the fact that news contained in the profit warnings has been 
anticipated by the market before the announcement date, hence some adjustments 
could already have been incorporated into the share price (Jackson and Madura 
2003). Investors have several sources they acquire information from, thus 
information leakage prior to the announcement date does not necessarily mean 
that the market is inefficient. Changes in security prices could also be caused by 
external factors, i.e. market specific risk. The effect of the announcement needs to 
be distinguished from the price movements caused by general market factors in 
order to deal with this issue. 
 
Acquiring detailed information of individual companies is time consuming and 
costly. Investors are only willing to actively collect additional information if they 
are compensated for the added effort through higher returns (Grossman and 
Stiglitz 1980). Active investment strategies for common shareholders are costly 
due to the low percentage gain from extensive information seeking. Mutual funds 
can pool interests together and gain from economies of scale which gives them a 
greater incentive to find mispriced stocks. An efficient market will allow for 
abnormal returns to compensate the ones who put in additional resources, but only 
enough to provide superior gross returns and average net returns (Malkiel 1989). 
Transaction costs and illiquidity are factors which make it harder to gain from 
systematically mispriced stocks, i.e. barriers to arbitrage. When evaluating 
whether the market is inefficient or not, these factors must be taken into 
consideration and a market is only inefficient if arbitrage is possible net of these 
costs. Furthermore, it could take a long time for a mispriced security to revert 
back to equilibrium, thus arbitrage is challenging, risky and may tie up capital.  
 
Abnormal returns (ARs) are defined as actual returns less expected returns 
implied by the asset pricing model. Presence of abnormal returns around events is 
not necessarily a violation of the efficient market hypothesis, but it is a violation if 
these abnormal returns persist over time and not follow a random walk. In an 
~The Information Content in Profit Warnings and the Implications for Market Rationality~ 
Page 9 
efficient market, security prices out of equilibrium converge towards its true value 
and it should be equal probability for whether a stock is over- or undervalued. 
2.3 Joint-Hypothesis Problem 
When testing whether a market is efficient, you are implicitly testing the 
assumptions that the asset pricing model is based upon (Brealey, Myers, and Allen 
2008). Any test of market efficiency is consequently also a joint test of whether 
the market model is correct. This is called the joint-hypothesis problem. If 
efficiency is rejected, it could be because the market truly is inefficient or because 
an incorrect equilibrium model has been assumed (Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay 
1997). In addition, Kothari and Warner (2004), points out that a set of 
assumptions concerning the statistical properties of the abnormal returns must be 
correctly specified. It follows that the mean abnormal returns for a cross-section 
of stocks must be normally distributed when performing a standard t-test. For 
large samples one can rely on the central limit theorem and asymptotic results, but 
the lack of normality in small samples can distort the statistical inferences. The 
implication of this theorem is that caution has to be taken when inferences are 
drawn upon market efficiency in small samples. Roll (1977) does moreover point 
out that the market portfolio is impossible to precisely estimate because the joint 
returns for all possible investment opportunities are unobservable.  
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3. Literature Review 
A fairly large number of studies are dedicated to profit warnings, especially in the 
US. We use the following subsection to highlight some of the most acknowledged 
papers and report their empirical findings. This section also refers to studies about 
event studies and market efficiency, and entails some specifics about the different 
approaches applied in existing research.   
3.1 Literature about Event Studies  
Profit warnings are pure information events, which make them well suited for 
event studies. An event study is a technique in empirical financial research which 
measures the impact of a specific event on the value of a firm. Given rationality in 
the marketplace the impact should immediately be reflected in the security prices 
(MacKinlay 1997). One of the first event studies was performed by James Dolley 
(1933) and it explored the procedure of common stock split-ups. His main finding 
was that prices increased more often than they declined following a common 
stock split. The first event studies suffered from several drawbacks, as they failed 
to separate general stock market price movements from the effect caused by the 
event, but these elements were gradually improved during the next three decades 
(MacKinlay 1997). The standard setting methodology applied in Ball and Brown 
and Fama’s studies in the 1960’s is still practiced, although some modifications 
have been introduced, mainly to comprehend with violation of statistical 
assumptions (Brown and Warner 1980; Brown and Warner 1985). 
3.2 Literature about Profit Warnings and Market Efficiency 
One of the first studies to empirically test whether stock prices adjust to the 
release of new information was performed by Ray Ball and Philip Brown in 1968. 
They conducted an event study on earnings announcements for 261 firms over the 
period 1957 to 1965 and measured whether reported earnings were greater or 
lower than what the market expected, using last year’s actual earnings as a proxy 
for the market expectations (Ball and Brown 1968; Scott 2012). The firms which 
reported good news experienced abnormal returns of 6% relative to the market in 
the period leading up to the earnings release, whereas firms that reported bad 
news underperformed with 9%. The interesting feature in this study was the 
accumulation of abnormal return prior to the event date, and Ball and Brown 
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concluded that the earnings report is not a medium that can be considered to be 
very timely.  
 
Kasznik and Lev (1995) examined the actions of the management prior to a large 
earnings surprise. Their focus was on how the management disclosed this 
information and how the investors responded to this. They found that the 
likelihood of issuing a warning was positively related to firm size, existence of 
preceding forecasts and affiliation to the high technology industry. Another 
finding was a higher tendency to disclose warnings with permanent earnings 
disappointments than transitory, which also appear to be what the investors are 
concerned about. Their study furthermore questioned why not more companies 
disclosed disappointing earnings announcements because of the beneficiary sides, 
e.g. deterring litigation and reducing transaction costs. A possible explanation is 
the fear of an overreaction among investors, which could outweigh the benefits of 
disclosing earnings surprises. Another study, written by Skinner (1994), found 
evidence of voluntary disclosure of bad news before earnings announcements. 
Managers face an asymmetric loss function when deciding upon disclosure policy, 
due to the fear of litigation and reputational costs. Skinner also reported that bad 
news were likely to be qualitative statements about the current quarter’s earnings, 
while good news tended to be point range or estimates of annual-EPS.  
 
Investor psychology and behavioral finance are aspects which have been given 
increased focus in research the last decades. Relatively many researchers believe 
that investor irrationality can be ascribed to these concepts. The models are 
anchored in prospect theory, which was developed by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979), as opposed to traditional decision theory which assumes rational agents 
and focuses on their total wealth (Scott 2012). The prospect theory describes why 
investors tend to react stronger to losses than to equally sized gains, i.e. loss 
aversion. Irrationality can be assigned to decision making under uncertainty with 
biased beliefs about probabilities of future events; hence the Bayesian updating 
process deviates from conventional risk-neutral probabilities. De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985) investigated violations of Bayes’ Theorem and why people tend to 
overreact to unexpected and dramatic news events. They provide evidence of a 
stronger market reaction to bad news (loosers) than to good news (winners) and 
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that this pattern is predictable, which implies a violation of the weak form of the 
EMH. An explanation for the findings is that investors’ posterior probabilities are 
greater than or less than what Bayes’ Theorem suggests, which results in an 
underweighting of probabilities due to investor overconfidence about own skills.   
 
A study which is of special interest to our research is written by Bulkley and 
Herrerias (2005). They found significant negative abnormal returns in the three 
months following a negative profit warning. This indicates that investors 
underreact to new information and that the speed of adjustment in the market is 
slow. A special feature in this study is the distinction between profit warnings that 
included a new forecast (quantitative) and profit warnings that only offered 
guidance about earnings below market expectation (qualitative). This 
classification makes it possible to test the precision of the announcement and 
whether the information content affects the size of the reaction (Bulkley and 
Herrerias 2005).   According to the study, one should expect to find lower post-
announcement abnormal returns for the warnings that provide quantitative 
information than the ones that only contribute with qualitative information. This is 
consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, which claims that the more 
informed the investors become the faster will the market correct mispricing. A 
greater market reaction to qualitative warnings may indicate that the investors are 
more uncertain about the future state of the company, i.e. they are risk-averse and 
reduce their holdings of these shares. This causes a downward shift in the supply 
curve resulting in a lower equilibrium price.  
3.3 Research on Information Leakage 
Studies on information leakage diverge somewhat, but several researchers submit 
evidence of information leakage prior to an event. Keown and Pinkerton (1981) 
provided significant confirmation of informational leakage as far as 12 trading 
days prior to merger announcements. Jackson and Madura (2003) detect 
information leakage prior to the announcements of profit warnings. They 
document an average negative cumulative abnormal return of 2.38% by applying 
a four-day window prior to the announcement date. Helbok and Walker (2003) 
report that evidence of informed trading prior to the release of profit warnings in 
the UK vanished after the companies became obliged to disclose information, 
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implying that increased disclosure of information results in a more efficient 
market. The fact that pre-announcement drift has been documented is a violation 
of the strong form of market efficiency and indicates that some market 
participants earn abnormal returns based on private information, though it can also 
be that the market anticipates forthcoming news.  
3.4 Literature about Post-Announcement Drift 
Among the recognized studies on post-announcement drift are Jones, Latanè and 
Rendleman (1982) and Ball and Brown (1968), who used the same method to rank 
and divide the firms into deciles based on the size of the earnings surprise. They 
calculated the CAR for each decile and found that the companies with the largest 
positive surprise experienced continuing CARs, while the companies with the 
most negative abnormal returns at t=0 experienced declining CARs. Jones, Latanè 
and Rendleman (1982) explained this observation with a gradual response to 
earnings announcements, but since this pattern is predictable it violates the theory 
about efficient markets (Bodie, Kane and Marcus 2011). This anomaly is known 
as post-earnings-announcement price drift which Bernard and Thomas (1990) 
later confirmed in their paper. Their article presented evidence of a slow market 
reaction to new information and that the signs and magnitude of the slow reaction 
were related to the autocorrelation structure of earnings. The predictability of 
future earnings due to autocorrelation in the residuals is evidence of market 
failure, i.e. market inefficiency (Bernard and Thomas 1990).  
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4. Methodology 
The methodology applied in this thesis is based upon the pioneering methods used 
in Ball and Brown (1968) and Bulkley and Herrerias’ (2005) studies. This section 
explains the underlying features of our research and how we carry it out. It also 
cover econometric problems that recur in event studies, how abnormal returns are 
calculated and the statistical tests conducted on the dataset.   
4.1 Estimation Window 
The length of the estimation period and the frequency of the data within the 
estimation window depend on the data availability and the specific event. The 
estimation window is applied to estimate    and   . In this paper we apply daily 
data and an estimation window which starts 254 days before the day of the event 
and ends the third day prior to the profit warning; hence, L1 = T1 – T0 = 252 days, 
see Figure 2. The length of L1 impacts the conditional variance of the abnormal 
returns, σ2(ARiτ), due to the additional variance that stems from the sampling error 
in αi and βi. Using a large estimation window with many observations causes the 
additional variance to approach zero, due to a reduced sampling error of the 
parameters, i.e. the conditional variance, σ2(ARiτ), approaches the disturbance 
variance, σ2εi (MacKinlay 1997). As the sampling error decreases with the length 
of the estimation window, the AR observations become independent through time.  
4.2 Event Window and Post-Event window 
The event window, L2, is determined to be greater than the specific event of 
interest in order to capture the total market reaction to the profit warning, 
measured by the level of abnormal return. Hence, our main event window is        
[-1, +1], i.e. three days. Extending the event window beyond three days would 
induce additional noise in the measurement. An additional argument for a short 
event window is that most of the reaction is likely to occur within minutes and 
that the power of a three day long main event window is high. A post-event 
window, L3, is also examined and the length of this window ought to be shorter 
than one year to secure that errors in risk-adjustment are mitigated (Kothari and 
Warner 2004). The length of the post-event window, L3, is 21 trading days and 
begins on the second day after the announcement [+2, +22]. The decision is made 
on the basis that profit warnings often are followed by earnings announcement 
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within a month, and because extending the window might capture confounding 
events that could distort the inferences regarding the causality of abnormal 
returns. The post-event window captures any price effects that occur after the 
event window, like momentum and reversal effects. 
 
A total of six event windows have been created to depict the price reaction clearer 
and to test the different hypotheses. The event windows which only include the 
days before the announcement day provide insight about information leakage and 
the leakage is represented by abnormal returns in the preceding days. Contrary, 
event windows that only include the days following the announcement day give 
an indication of how fast new information is absorbed by the market after 
announcement.  
4.3 The Market Model 
This subsection provides a discussion about the choice of asset pricing model and 
the methodology used to calculate abnormal returns. An essential aspect of event 
studies is the measurement of abnormal returns, for the reason that presence of 
abnormal returns could suggests that the market is inefficient, i.e. an arbitrage 
opportunity exists (MacKinlay 1997). An asset pricing model which estimates the 
expected returns is required to calculate the abnormal returns. This paper employs 
the market model, which assumes a stable linear relation between the security’s 
return and the market return (Copeland, Weston, and Shastri 2005).  
 
The underlying assumptions in the market model are purely statistical as it is not 
an economic model. The assets returns are therefore assumed to be jointly 
multivariate normal, in addition to independently and identically distributed 
through time. These are distributional assumptions in the market model 
(MacKinlay 1997). The rationale for selecting this model is the large impact a 
profit warning has on the return on the day of the event, and a more advanced 
model will consequently not improve the explanatory power significantly. 
MacKinlay (1997) argues that the market model is superior to the constant mean 
return model since the variance of the abnormal return is reduced. Another point 
in his article is that the market model is characterized as an improvement because 
the return related to the variation in the market return is removed. The reduced 
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variation in the abnormal return increases the ability to detect the effect 
conditional on the event. The gains from applying multifactor models in event 
studies are limited, because introducing additional factors with low explanatory 
power not necessarily reduce the variance of the abnormal return.   
 
Equation (1) express the linear relationship between the expected return for the 
individual security, E(Ri,t), and the return on the market portfolio, Rm. Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) is used to minimize the sum of the squared residuals and to 
find the OLS-estimates that fits the straight line best.  
 
                             (1)  
E(εi,t)  = 0 is the zero mean disturbance term  
Var(εi,t) = σi,t
2  is the variance of the disturbance term 
 
The parameters  ,    and σ are estimated using Equation (1) over the estimation 
window, L1. The event window, T2 – T1, is excluded from the estimation period to 
avoid that the particular event of interest influences the parameters.  
 
Figure 2: Overview of Event Study 
 
Applying the estimated α and β makes it possible to calculate the expected return 
for the event window. The actual returns needs to be calculated for each day in the 
event window, L2 = T2 – T1, before abnormal returns can be defined. Equation (2) 
is the formula for log returns. The reason for using log returns is that they 
conform better to the normality assumptions in the regression and because the 
transformation makes it easier to convert daily returns to weekly or monthly.   
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Ri, τ =   
  τ
  τ  
         (2) 
 
ARi,τ = Ri, τ –   i –   iRm,τ         (3) 
 
ARi,τ = Ri, τ –     i, τ 
 
The abnormal return, ARi,τ, is equivalent to the return conditional on the event, 
Ri,τ, less the expected return unconditional on the event, (α +βiRm,τ), expressed by 
Equation (3). In other words, the abnormal return is the error term from the 
regression, i.e. the unexpected component (MacKinlay 1997). 
4.4 Aggregating Abnormal Return  
The next step is to aggregate the abnormal returns over time and across the 
securities in the sample. The cumulative abnormal returns for each security are 
aggregated over time using Equation (4) below.  
       ,          
  
     
                                                                
          
Equation (4) is the formula for the CAR for one single event, and it is therefore 
necessary to aggregate the CARs for all event observations before final inferences 
can be made. The dataset has been controlled for clustering before cross-sectional 
aggregation. Clustering is the overlap of profit warnings in the event window, 
which could bias the result of an event. The reason why clustering may bias a 
conclusion is the non-zero covariance between the clustered abnormal returns, an 
issue which is addressed later in the paper. If no clustering of events exists or if 
they have no effect on each other, then the individual abnormal returns from 
Equation (3) can be aggregated for each event. The sample aggregated abnormal 
returns are calculated using Equation (5), where the number of events are N = 
184.  
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These average abnormal returns can then be aggregated in the same manner as in 
Equation (4), which captures the total market reaction to the profit warning for the 
entire event period. The median cumulative abnormal returns and the mean CARs 
are both reported as they provide useful information about the sample distribution. 
   
      ,           
  
     
                                                                    
 
4.5 Econometric Problems 
This subsection addresses econometric problems. The daily security returns are 
tested for normality, heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. Financial events are 
often associated with variance shifts that may influence the power of the test and 
specification of the model. Another factor to consider is correlation between 
residuals, εit, and the return on the market portfolio, Rmt. Presence of this type of 
correlation will often bias the expected return of the securities, E(Rit), and cause a 
misspecification of the model (Henderson 1990). A final issue to reflect on is the 
presence of event clustering, a problem that occur when the profit warnings are 
overlapping. If events overlap, then the covariance between the securities could be 
different from zero. Clustering will distort the distributional results for the 
aggregated abnormal returns (MacKinlay 1997). In order to deal with this issue 
one alternative is to analyze the abnormal returns before the aggregation, and use 
a hypothesis test with the null-hypothesis that the event has no impact when 
applying non-aggregated data. This is a method used in the presence of a large 
clustering, i.e. many profit warnings on the same date. The drawback of this 
approach is the low sample properties of the test statistics and the test has often 
little power against economically reasonable alternatives (MacKinlay 1997; 
Bernard 1987). Another option is to remove the overlapping events from the 
sample.   
4.5.1 OLS Estimation 
The parameter (beta) estimation in the market model is based on the ordinary least 
square (OLS) method. Five assumptions listed in Table 1 have to be satisfied in 
order to draw statistically valid inferences from the OLS method: 
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Assumption 1 is about strict exogeneity and states that the errors in the regression 
should be zero on average, while assumption 4 require that the predictable 
variables are non-stochastic, thus not random variables and not correlated with the 
error term. These two assumptions are fulfilled and are not further elucidated. We 
will henceforth elaborate on the OLS-method applied in our study and discuss 
consequences and implications if any of the three remaining assumptions are 
violated. The results from the statistical tests for all individual time series are 
provided in Appendix 4.  
4.5.1.1 Heteroscedasticity 
The second assumption related to the classical linear regression model (CLRM) 
requires the variance of the errors to be constant over time. This desirable feature 
is known as homoscedasticity as opposed to heteroscedasticity, where the residual 
variance varies over time. If heteroscedasticity is discovered it could be a result of 
an observable systematic pattern, such as an increase in variance caused by an 
increase in an explanatory variable, or it could simply be changes in variance over 
time, i.e. autoregressive conditionally heteroscedastic (ARCH) processes. In this 
study we apply White’s test to examine the variance over time. The form of the 
heteroscedasticity is rarely known and White’s test does fortunately not make any 
assumptions about the pattern in variances. White’s test runs an auxiliary 
regression where the squared residuals are regressed on the original variables, the 
cross product of the variables and the squared independent variables. A rejection 
of the null-hypothesis implies that the time-series is heteroscedastic.  
 
The results from the analysis identifies 31 series with heteroscedasticity, 29 series 
with ambiguous results and 124 series with homoscedastic variance at a 5% 
Assumption 1: E (Ut) = 0
Assumption 2: Var (Ut) = σ
2 < ∞
Assumption 3: Cov (Ui, Uj) = 0
Assumption 4: Cov (Ut, Xt) = 0 
Assumption 5: Ut  ~ N (0, σ
2)
Underlying assumptions of the classical linear regression model
Table 1: OLS - Assumptions
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significance level, see Appendix 4. Further examination of the variances detects 
that 13 of the observations with heteroscedasticity are clustered in the 15 months 
surrounding the financial crisis (May 2008 to July 2009). These results support 
the claim that stock volatility changes during recessions and financial crises 
(Schwert 1989). A large fraction of the observations with heteroscedasticity is 
therefore partly caused by significant changes in the dependent variable.  
 
Non-constant variance is common in time-series data and the consequences are 
inefficient coefficients derived from the OLS-estimation and possibly invalid 
standard errors. Harrington and Shrider (2007) proclaim that ignoring 
heteroscedasticity can cause biases in abnormal returns and wrong inferences 
about the event’s significance. One possible solution is to use White’s modified 
standard error estimates, but the changes in the significances of the parameters 
were marginal for the heteroscedastic-series in our sample. Fox (1997) point out 
that unequal error variance is worth correcting only when the problem is severe. 
The magnitude of the abnormal returns surrounding the event causes 
misspecification in the standard error estimates to be less prominent and does not 
alter the statistical validity of this study. Additionally, by applying the 
standardized residual tests on the ARs, which is robust to heteroscedastic event-
window abnormal returns, we are confident that our conclusions considering the 
significance of the returns are valid.  
4.5.1.2 Autocorrelation 
The term autocorrelation is used to describe a situation where the error terms co-
vary over time and it can be observed in time-series. The third assumption of the 
CLRM states that the disturbances should be uncorrelated, thus linearly 
independent of each other. Any kind of serial correlation or systematic pattern 
over time is a violation of the assumption and could lead to incorrect estimation of 
standard errors. It has been established that time series of daily returns exhibit 
some autocorrelation for short lags (Mandelbrot 1963). Autocorrelation could lead 
to wrong inferences about the variables in the regression, but the coefficient will 
still be unbiased (Brooks 2008). There are two types of serial correlation, namely 
positive and negative. Possible consequences of positive serial correlation are 
underestimated standard errors and inflated t-stats which could cause Type I- 
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DL 1.52
DU 1.56
4-DU 2.44
4-DL 2.48
( >100 obs, 1 var)
Critical values 1%-level 
Table 2: Critical Values of the Durbin-Watson Statistics
errors, while overestimation and Type II-errors are risked in the presence of 
negative autocorrelation.  
 
The Durbin-Watson test (DW) is performed to identify whether first-order 
autocorrelation is present in the data; hence, it is testing consecutive error terms. 
The Durbin-Watson test statistics are based on one-period lagged residuals, since 
the actual errors themselves are unobservable. A special feature of the DW test is 
that it does not follow a standard statistical distribution. Instead it has an upper 
and a lower critical value. The DW test statistics are bound to lie between 0 and 4, 
where a value close to 2 indicates that no autocorrelation is found in the data. The 
critical values for a sample with more than 100 observations and one explanatory 
factor are 1.52 and 1.56 at a 1% significance level. The characteristics for the DW 
test applicable to our sample and the results of the test are summarized in Table 2 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Autocorrelation is discovered in 24 time-series, implying that approximately 13% 
of the series not satisfy the assumption of independent residuals. 23 incidents of 
negative autocorrelation are found, meaning that the probability of a positive error 
for one observation increases the probability of a subsequent negative error. One 
factor that partially contributes to first-order autocorrelation is thin trading which 
causes missing data points. Missing observations is not a favorable feature in a 
dataset as it reduces the reliability of the estimates (Scholes and Williams 1977). 
Regions Implications No. of observations
0 - 1,52 Reject H0 → Positive autocorrelation 1
1,52 - 1,56 The test is inconclusive 0
1,56 - 2,44 Keep H0 → No autocorrelation 154
2,44 - 2,48 The test is inconclusive 6
2,48 - 4 Reject H0 → Negative autocorrelation 23
184
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We moreover found six of the observations to lie in the intermediate region where 
the test results are inconclusive. The beta coefficients are on average equal to their 
true values, but 24 of the beta parameters are inefficient, thus other estimators 
could have a smaller variance and the probability of dispersion from the true beta 
is no longer minimized.  
 
The dominance of negative serial correlations causing overstated standard errors 
and Type II-errors to be the largest threat. In other words the issue of not rejecting 
the null-hypothesis when it actually is false needs to be addressed. Most of the 
beta estimates in the sample have high t-stats and the problem of Type II-errors 
does not seem to be a severe problem in our sample, see Appendix 5. However, 
the lack of normality in the series influences the conclusion regarding hypothesis 
testing on parameters, an issue which is discussed in the subsequent section. 154 
out of 184 of the error terms are orthogonal and makes up the largest fraction of 
the sample. Based on an overall assessment, we have decided not to adjust for 
autocorrelation for the respective 24 observations. Dealing with autocorrelation 
can be done in several ways, depending on the form of autocorrelation and the 
specific situation, and each approach has its pros and cons, but the main decisive 
element for no adjustment was limited documented effect on daily stock returns 
(Brown and Warner 1985). Finally, the study is performed on a relatively short 
event window, where possible misspecifications have a small effect on the 
abnormal returns. This is because the daily returns conditional on the events are 
very high compared to the expected returns.  
4.5.1.3 Normal distribution 
The fifth and final CLRM-assumption states that the disturbances must follow a 
normal distribution and that a random variable should be normally distributed. A 
normal (Gaussian) distribution can be defined as a probability distribution that 
plots all of its values in a symmetrical manner and where the majority of the 
results are situated around the probability's mean (Newbold, Carlson and Thorne 
2010). If the residuals deviate from normality, then it is not possible to draw any 
valid inferences from hypothesis tests conducted on the model parameters. In our 
sample we find various series which does not satisfy the normality properties. The 
normality test detect that the series exhibit skewness and positive kurtosis, 
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implying that the distribution is leptokurtic, has fatter tails and is more peaked at 
the mean.  
 
The discovery of non-normality is a common feature for financial data and it is 
particularly often documented for individual securities when using daily data 
(Fama 1976). However, the central limit theorem and the law of large numbers 
states that the distribution of the sample means will converge toward a normal 
distribution and that the violation of the normality is practically inconsequential 
for large sample sizes (Billingsley 1995). The number of observations is about 
large enough to satisfy this condition. Brown and Warner (1985) show that non-
normality of daily returns has little impact on event study methodologies. The 
conclusion is that we cannot draw any inferences considering the statistical 
significance of the parameters, but that non-normality has a negligible impact on 
the results in our study.   
4.6 Significance Testing of Abnormal Returns 
In this subsection we cover potential pitfalls associated with event studies and the 
tests of significance for abnormal returns. Assessing these issues is important 
before any statistical inferences can be drawn from the results. Various 
significance tests are employed on the abnormal returns to make sure that the 
model is correctly specified, and that no additional modifications of the model are 
needed. If the model is not able to distinguish between the null-hypothesis and 
economically interesting alternatives, then the model design has to be modified 
(MacKinlay 1997). 
4.6.1 Tests of Significance 
A two sided t-test of the cumulative abnormal returns from Equation (6) is 
performed to determine the significance level and to address whether the null- 
hypothesis can be rejected. The test is two-sided since abnormal returns can be 
both negative and positive. Imprecise predictions about the securities’ 
unconditional expected returns and the component of the realized return on the 
event day, which is not attributable to the event itself, are two reasons why 
abnormal returns are measured with error (Kothari and Warner 2004). Both 
parametric and non-parametric tests are used in this study, but note that other 
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studies have found non-parametric tests to be unnecessary complicated and not 
well-performing (Henderson 1990). The differences between the two types of tests 
are the underlying assumptions about the distribution of abnormal returns 
(MacKinlay 1997), and employing both types increases the reliability of our 
results.  
 
The parametric tests applied are the cross-sectional t-test and Patell’s standardized 
residual test, and they are quoted in the result tables with t-values and z-values for 
the different event windows. We are testing for mean effects with changing 
variances and it is consequently necessary to form an estimator of the variance 
that does not rely upon past returns. MacKinlay (1997) argues that this 
assumption is satisfied in the cross-sectional t-test if no clustering of events exists. 
Patell-Z test is a complimentary test which is robust to heteroscedastic abnormal 
returns. One characteristic of the standardized residual test is that it assigns a 
lower weight to abnormal returns that exhibit a high variance during the event 
window (Event Study Metrics 2011).  
 
Non-normality issues are likely for daily returns; hence, we run two non-
parametric tests to further increase the reliability of the results. The generalized 
sign test checks whether the CARs have an equal probability to be positive or 
negative. Differences between mean and median CARs are found in the sample, 
and further analysis detects that the distribution is skewed. MacKinlay argues that 
the test not necessarily is well specified in the presence of skewness. To 
compensate for this weakness we also report the Corrado Rank-test as a second 
non-parametric test. The Rank-test assess whether the average abnormal return is 
zero and is applicable for individual securities as well as portfolios (Event Study 
Metrics 2011). The power of a study is determined by the sample size, length of 
the event window and the size of the abnormal returns. MacKinlay (1997) argues 
that the power of a test increases with sample size and abnormal returns on the 
event day, and decreases with the length of the event window. We expect to find 
substantial abnormal returns on the announcement day, due to the element of 
surprise in profit warnings. Hence, the power of the event study’s test statistics is 
likely to be high.  
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 - Listed 254 trading days prior to the event window
 - Traded in the main event window [-1, 0, +1]
 - Traded at least 100 days in the estimation window
 - No repeating events in 22 days following a PW
 - The outliers caused by previous profit wanings are removed from the estimation window
Table 3: Sample Criteria
5. Data 
This section contains an overview of the data and the data collection process. The 
sample criteria for the profit warnings are defined and justified, and an 
explanation of how each individual disclosure is analyzed is provided. This 
section furthermore covers sources of error in the dataset and how these problems 
are dealt with. The last subsection includes the descriptive statistics of the data. 
Oslo Stock Exchange All-Share Index (OSEAX) has been selected to be the proxy 
for the market portfolio. The OSEAX-index consists of all the listed companies in 
Norway and is adjusted for dividend payments. Stock returns for each company 
are retrieved from Datastream, while the OSEAX-index is downloaded from Oslo 
Stock Exchange’s web pages.  
5.1 Data Collection 
The first step in the data collection process is to define the date of the event, i.e. 
the announcement date of the profit warning. The event date sets the pre-
conditions for estimation of α and β based on the estimation window, and the 
parameters are used to calculate the expected returns in the event window. Each 
individual profit warning, and hence date, is retrieved from notifications 
submitted to Oslo Stock Exchange via NewsWeb by listed companies. Processing 
each submitted notification to assess whether it is a profit warning or not is 
indispensable and can be a source of error in the dataset, but it is a necessity due 
to the lack of existing alternatives. A list of all the profit warnings in the sample 
can be found in Appendix 3, which includes information about the characteristics 
of the warnings. The criteria for inclusion in the sample are presented in Table 3, 
and we will henceforth discuss some of the reasons for the criteria formulation 
and inflicting implications. 
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5.2 Estimation Window 
For some of the companies it is not possible to use an estimation window of 252 
trading days prior to the event window when estimating the parameters because of 
limited data. The period from the initial public offering until the profit warning is 
announced, is not long enough to provide sufficient amount of data points to 
secure valid beta estimates. These companies have been excluded in our dataset to 
secure consistency. The length of one year is based on the comprehension that 
some of the companies are thinly traded, even though it can be argued that a 
shorter estimation window could have been statistically valid. An additional issue 
related to a shorter estimation window is that the variance of the CAR must be 
adjusted for estimation error in the market model parameters (MacKinlay 1997).  
 
Another problem is illiquidity issues, including the thin trading bias and bid-ask 
spread bounces. Companies that are not actively traded and have many missing 
data points are therefore removed from the dataset. This is done because missing 
observations gives a downward biased estimate of the regressed betas (Koller, 
Goedhart, and Wessels 1990). One possible solution to this measurement problem 
is to use weekly or monthly observations to estimate beta or apply an industry 
beta. Employing weekly or monthly data with lower sampling frequency reduces 
the number of applicable events, which could be troublesome in this study due to 
the moderate sample size of 184 profit warnings, compared to studies conducted 
on the US stock market. Moreover, by applying daily data and a short estimation 
period we implicitly accommodate for the comprehension that individual security 
betas are changing over time. A short estimation period with a high sample 
frequency secures that the beta is based on recent firm characteristics and provides 
a better proxy for the true beta at the announcement date. This induces more noise 
in the data and increases the chance of the parameters being influenced by 
extreme values.  
 
Bid-ask spread bounce is a potential source to distortions in beta estimation as the 
last recorded trade does not take into account whether it was initiated by the 
bidder (bid price) or the seller (ask price). Large bid-ask spread and low trading 
volume results in a false impression of abnormal returns associated with the 
specific event (Sercu, Vandebroeck, and Vinaimont 2007).  
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The data mining process induces reliability to our estimates and is done to secure 
statistical and economically reasonable betas. Prem Jain (1986) finds that 
adjusting for thin trading is not that important when employing the OLS 
estimator, as potentially biased estimates not result in misspecification of event 
study methodologies. The threshold of at least 100 trading days during the 
estimation window is therefore mainly a consistency check. We have also made 
sure that the day of the announcement coincides with the actual event day, since 
some of the companies disclosed the information after closing hours. Failing to 
determine correct event day would have caused wrong inferences about the timing 
of the abnormal returns. Abnormal returns would emerge the following day, 
indicating a false one-day delayed market reaction. 
 
In terms of companies that issues several profit warnings within a year, we have 
adjusted the outliers in the estimation window. Several profit warnings filed by 
the same company are likely to cause large price changes and could change the 
beta estimates drastically. The outliers in the dataset, that is the abnormal returns 
on the announcement date of previous warnings, have been fixed to zero, thereby 
mitigating the problem of a biased beta estimate.  
5.3 Event Window and Repeating Events      
It is also determined that the stocks have to be traded in the event window, thus at 
least one out of three days. In order to test how the investors respond to 
unexpected news, shares have to change ownership, otherwise there will be no 
movements in stock prices and impossible to investigate the market reaction. In 
the presence of event clustering, repeating profit warnings are removed from the 
sample if they are disclosed by the same company within a period of 22 trading 
days following the first disclosure. Ignoring repeating warnings could cause 
severe misspecifications regarding conclusions based on stock price movements in 
the post-announcement window. Altogether, various consistency checks of our 
sample reduce the number of profit warnings from 270 to 184.     
5.4 Classification of Profit Warnings 
The sample has been divided into subsamples in order to examine whether the 
type of profit warning influence how investors respond to unexpected news. The 
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smallest subsample is the sample consisting of qualitative profit warnings and 
includes 40 observations, but it has sufficient statistical power. The distinction 
between qualitative and quantitative warnings is made by assessing each profit 
warning individually. Profit warnings that only declare whether operating 
performance would be better or worse than expected are classified as qualitative, 
whereas profit warnings that include any kind of numerical estimates are 
classified as quantitative. The quality of the forecasts and level of details disclosed 
are not further explored due to subjectivity and limited available data about 
investors’ expectations prior to the news release. In this context, it could be of 
great interest to explore the possibility of creating a warning response coefficient, 
which could measure the unexpected portion in the announcements.  
 
Another classification that has been made is the distinction between positive and 
negative warnings, and they have been divided into subsamples based on a 
subjective assessment by the authors. The underlying motive for the classification 
is that existing studies mainly focus on negative disclosures and few researchers 
include positive warnings in their dataset. Including positive warnings in the 
dataset allows us to measure the impact of positive news and compare it to the 
market reaction to negative information. This is done on the premise that investors 
possibly react stronger to bad news than good news, i.e. losses are penalized 
harder than equally sized gains. Some warnings include both good and bad news 
which could distort the conclusion, but we have made an assessment based on the 
total effect of the information. In presence of confounding effects, additional 
information seeking has been performed to ensure that the issuer does not try to 
disguise bad news behind good news.  
 
This paper does not account for whether negative and positive profit warnings are 
better or worse than what the market predicts, i.e. we do not have a proxy for the 
market expectations. The market reaction could therefore be positive (negative), 
even though the content is negative (positive). As discussed more thoroughly in 
the result section, we observe that some announcements experience abnormal 
returns in the opposite direction of what we predicted. This behavioral feature of 
the information content is difficult to measure, due to limited available data on 
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Pos-Quant Pos-Qual Neg-Quant Neg-Qual
2005 8 1 13 3
2006 4 1 9 6
2007 6 1 20 6
2008 10 2 21 5
2009 0 3 14 0
2010 2 2 8 1
2011 3 1 10 2
2012 4 1 12 5
Total 37 12 107 28 184
Table 4: Classification of Profit Warnings
Positive (= 50) Negative (= 134)
( Quant = Quantitiative, Qual = Qualitative)
This table shows the number of quantitiative and qualitative profit 
warnings for announcements classified as positive and negative. 
existing market expectations at the announcement date, but it is discussed to some 
extent because of its apparent implications on abnormal returns.  
5.5 Descriptive Statistics  
The total sample consists of 184 observations. Among them are 50 defined as 
positive profit warnings, whereas 134 are defined as negative. The classification 
of warnings yields 144 quantitative warnings and 40 qualitative warnings. The 
fact that negative profit warnings predominates the sample could simply be due to 
the turbulent sample period, or it could be because firms are more concerned with 
informing about negative surprises to avoid lawsuit and discontented investors.  
The frequency of disclosures seems to increase during bear markets and subside in 
bull markets.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking at Table 4, we notice that many companies issued profit warnings in the 
period leading up to and during the financial crisis. Interestingly, and somewhat 
surprisingly, is the high number of positive warnings submitted during the same 
period. 31.5% of the warnings in 2008 are characterized as positive and this 
observation could be related to management’s incentive to provide good news 
during periods with economic turmoil. Depression and extreme drops in security 
prices may lead to widespread panic, whereby the management tries to reduce the 
downward pressure on their stock price. Financial market turmoil increases the 
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Sector No.
Consumer Discretionary 9
Consumer Staples 15
Energy 43
Financials 12
Health care 11
Industry 28
Information Technology 54
Materials 10
Telecommunication Services 2
Utilities 0
184
Table 5: Sectors and Profit Warnings
desire to inform the market about positive news and that the firm is outperforming 
the market. There are considerably more quantitative profit warnings than 
qualitative in the sample, and it is no obvious coherence between good or bad 
news and the degree of disclosure, as opposed to what Skinner (1994) reported. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A list of the sectors that the companies operate in is provided in Table 5. A 
substantial share of the warnings is disclosed by companies within the IT-sector 
(29.3%), the energy sector (23.4%) and the industry sector (15.2%). This 
observation coincides with the findings of Kasznik and Lev (1995), who 
demonstrated that the high technology sector was positively related to the 
likelihood of disclosing profit warnings. Companies within the utility sector and 
the telecommunication services are underrepresented in our sample. The 
distribution of warnings across industries is mainly due to the number of 
companies within each sector at Oslo Stock Exchange, but it still provide some 
guidance about which types of companies that experience the greatest fluctuations 
in operating performance.  
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Mean Median Max Min Std.dev.
2005 25 14 % 8.6 % 6.4 % 13.4 % -43.0 % 50.7 %
2006 20 11 % 9.7 % 7.1 % 23.0 % -46.3 % 52.5 %
2007 33 18 % 8.9 % 6.7 % 12.6 % -31.6 % 42.9 %
2008 38 21 % 7.9 % 6.8 % 19.8 % -28.4 % 53.2 %
2009 17 9 % 9.6 % 5.1 % 15.0 % -76.8 % 85.4 %
2010 13 7 % 9.2 % 7.2 % 7.5 % -31.1 % 54.0 %
2011 16 9 % 6.0 % 4.8 % 7.6 % -15.9 % 57.0 %
2012 22 12 % 10.1 % 6.9 % 21.6 % -78.1 % 67.8 %
Total sample 184 9.1 % 6.9 % 56.0 %
Distribution of Companies with Profit Warnings by Calendar Year
Table 6: Overview of Results
Year
No. of 
observations
% of total 
sample
CAR AR
Mean and median are absolute values of the abnormal returns on the announcement 
day of the profit warning. They are calculated by squaring the mean and median 
values and then taking the square root of these values. Max is the highest positive 
abnormal return, while Min is the highest negative abnormal return in a given year.
6. Results 
In this section we report and interpret the results from the analysis. The section 
has been divided into subsections where the distinct hypotheses are addressed. An 
overview of the results is presented with cumulative abnormal returns for each 
year. The main results have been split up into five different panels to provide 
greater insight about the characteristics of the sample and to investigate the 
market reaction in each subsample. The total sample has moreover been divided 
into deciles based on the level of abnormal returns in the event window. 
Comparing the deciles enable us to look for patterns and differences between 
companies that experienced different magnitudes of abnormal returns in the days 
surrounding the announcement.  
6.1 Overview of results 
Table 6 displays cumulative abnormal returns at the announcement day, measured 
in absolute values. Absolute values are good indicators of the overall magnitude 
of the market reactions, because positive and negative mean abnormal returns do 
not cancel each other out. The average annual standard deviation for a stock in a 
given year is reported in the last column of Table 6, while the standard deviation 
for each individual stock is provided in Appendix 6. 
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Looking at the number of profit warnings in the sample period we observe that 
2007 and 2008 have a greater number of disclosures, but the extent of the 
reactions was lower than what we expected. The dispersion seems to be fairly 
concentrated around its mean in these two years, as there is a relative narrow 
bandwidth between maximum and minimum abnormal returns and relative low 
annual standard deviations. One explanation to this occurrence could be the bad 
market conditions in 2007 and 2008. Investors reduce their expectations about 
future profitability during periods with lower economic growth and low market 
consensus. Releasing profit warnings under these circumstances will therefore 
result in a lower market reaction than presumed because the market anticipated 
the bad news, i.e. the probability of negative news has increased.  
 
The same analogy can be related to periods with increasing security prices, such 
as 2009 and 2012, implying that the market revises the estimates upward in bull 
markets. Unveiling that the company is failing to meet these expectations by 
disclosing a negative profit warning is consequently penalized harder by the 
market. Companies that disclosed profit warnings during 2009 and 2012 
experienced larger reactions to negative warnings than other years, where the 
most extreme abnormal returns were -76.8% and -78.1% respectively, and the 
annual standard deviations were among the highest in the sample. These results 
support the norm that issuing negative warnings in periods with increasing 
investor confidence is a particularly bad signal regarding a firm’s operating 
performance.  
 
The overall market reaction on the announcement day is substantial, with a mean 
Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for the full sample of 9.1%, whereas the 
median CAR for the full sample is 6.9%. The largest market reaction at the event 
day is -78.1%. Mean values are heavily influenced by outliers, which is the main 
reason why both mean and median values are quoted in the following subsections.   
6.2 Impacts from Warning Announcements  
The results for the full sample, consisting of 184 profit warnings are given in 
Table 7, Panel A. The mean (median) abnormal return is -6.36% (-4.08%) in the 
event window [-1, +1], which is significantly different from zero at a 0.1%-level, 
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applying both parametric and non-parametric tests. The fact that the mean is more 
negative than the median for all significant CARs in all event windows could 
indicate that large negative outliers are present. Appendix 7 presents a histogram 
of the negatively skewed abnormal returns on the announcement day, and the 
skewness in the sample is -2.2. The generalized sign test provides further 
assurance of a negatively skewed distribution as all values are negative and 
significant at a 0.1%-level. 
 
 Panel A illustrates that the market reaction is greatest at the announcement day,     
-5.25% (-4.44%), and there is no evidence of abnormal returns on the day prior to 
the announcement, which is elucidated in Figure 3. The lack of information 
leakage fortifies that profit warnings are unexpected events and they are not 
anticipated by the market. Panel A demonstrates that there seems to be a -1.08%  
(-0.85%) delayed market response on day one. A delayed reaction is a sign of 
inertia and can be evidence of poor quality in the disclosed profit warning, 
meaning that the information is inaccurate or incomplete. We would like to 
emphasize that these results and the results reported in the subsamples are based 
on the mean (median) reaction, not measured in absolute values. Positive and 
negative abnormal returns will to some degree cancel each other out. 
 
Figure 3: Cumulative Average Abnormal Return and Average Abnormal Return  
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The post-event window, [+2, +22], is used to test whether this slow market 
reaction persist or if a reversal in security prices occur following a profit warning. 
Panel A gives no indication of post-announcement price drift in either direction, 
as the mean (median) CAR is found to be 0.01% (-0.28%) and insignificant for 
most of the statistical tests. It seems to be some reversal in Panel C, but these 
abnormal returns are insignificant as well. Results from the preceding days and 
the days following the main event window are in line with the semi-strong form of 
the efficient market hypothesis, and Figure 3 depicts this clearly. The presence of 
a small one-day delayed market reaction could indicate that the market is 
inefficient since all information is not embedded in the security price 
immediately.  
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Event Mean Median t-stat Corrado
 Window  CAR  CAR  cross-sec.  Rank
[ - 2, + 2] 184 -6,46 % -4,07 % 53 : 131 -6,23 *** -12,51 *** -5,61 *** -7,80 ***
[ - 1, +1 ] 184 -6,36 % -4,08 % 55 : 129 -6,07 *** -15,77 *** -6,54 *** -7,50 ***
[ - 1] 184 -0,04 % 0,00 % 103 : 81 -0,14 -0,15 -0,48 -0,35
[ 0 ] 184 -5,25 % -4,44 % 59 : 125 -5,39 *** -22,66 *** -7,84 *** -6,90 ***
[ + 1] 184 -1,08 % -0,85 % 84 : 100 -3,09 ** -4,50 *** -3,00 ** -3,18 **
[ + 2, + 22] 184 0,01 % -0,28 % 90 : 94 0,00 -0,94 -1,05 -2,28 *
Event Mean Median t-stat Corrado
 Window  CAR  CAR  cross-sec.  Rank
[ - 2, + 2] 144 -6,46 % -3,57 % 41 : 103 -5,60 *** -11,42 *** -4,85 *** -6,73 ***
[ - 1, +1 ] 144 -6,64 % -4,83 % 44 : 100 -5,61 *** -14,68 *** -5,50 *** -6,22 ***
[ - 1] 144 -0,06 % -0,19 % 76 : 68 -0,20 -0,21 -0,53 -0,85
[ 0 ] 144 -5,77 % -4,16 % 46 : 98 -5,01 *** -22,11 *** -7,03 *** -5,89 ***
[ + 1] 144 -0,81 % -0,47 % 68 : 76 -2,34 * -3,12 * -1,96 -2,19 *
[ + 2, + 22] 144 -0,54 % 0,01 % 72 : 72 -0,33 -1,15 -1,41 -1,52
Event Mean Median t-stat Corrado
 Window  CAR  CAR  cross-sec.  Rank
[ - 2, + 2] 40 -6,63 % -5,33 % 12:28 -2,77 * -2,77 *** -3,45 *** -4,09 ***
[ - 1, +1 ] 40 -5,28 % -3,76 % 11:29 -2,34 * -2,34 *** -4,14 *** -4,42 ***
[ - 1] 40 0,07 % 0,14 %     27:13 1 0,16 0,16 -0,02 0,78
[ 0 ] 40 -3,24 % -4,37 % 13:27 -1,96 -1,96 *** -3,95 *** -3,77 ***
[ + 1] 40 -2,10 % -1,88 % 15:25 -2,10 * -2,10 *** -3,20 *** -3,12 ***
[ + 2, + 22] 40 2,19 % 1,68 % 19:21 0,80 0,21 0,45 -1,82
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0,1%, 1% and 5% -level respectively
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0,1%, 1% and 5% -level respectively
Panel C: Qualitative
N Pos : Neg Patell-Z Sign test
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0,1%, 1% and 5% -level respectively
Panel B: Quantitative
N Pos : Neg Patell-Z Sign test
Table 7: Profit Warning Cumulative Abnormal Returns 2005 - 2012
Panel A: Full sample
N Pos : Neg Patell-Z Sign test
N is the number of companies in the sample for a given event window.  The column "Pos : Neg" shows the 
number of observations with positive and negative abnormal returns during the event windows. T-stat 
cross-sectional and Patell-Z are parametric tests, while Corrado Rank test and Sign test are non-parametric 
tests.  ***, **,* indicates the level of significance for mean CARs. Panel A displays the results for the total 
sample. Panel B shows the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) and median cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR) for Quantitative Profit Warnings in the stated event windows.  Panel C shows CAAR and 
Median CAR for Qualitative Profit Warnings.
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6.3 Information Content in Profit Warnings 
The sample has been split up into two subsamples to test whether the different 
types of profit warnings affects the size of the abnormal returns. The CARs of the 
quantitative warnings are given in Panel B, while Panel C shows the results of the 
qualitative warnings. Based on the fourth hypothesis we expected that quantitative 
warnings would have a lower market reaction than qualitative. Other studies have 
found evidence of an overreaction to qualitative warnings. Since there is more 
information inherent in quantitative warnings, less uncertainty is embedded in the 
more detailed forecasts and investors act more rationally. We have found negative 
abnormal returns on the announcement day for both types of warnings, but the 
market reaction is greater for quantitative warnings, which contradicts the 
expectations. The mean (median) CAR for the quantitative warnings at the 
announcement day is -5.77% (-4.16%), while the mean (median) CAR for the 
qualitative warnings is -3.24% (-4.37%), implying a mean difference of -2.53%. 
All CARs at the announcement day are significant at a 0.1%-level.  
 
Turning to the main event window, the disparity has decreased to a mean 
difference of -1.36%. Further examination of the CAR for each day in the main 
event window detects that there is no evidence of CARs in either panel on the 
preceding day, day -1, implying no information leakage for either subsample. On 
the other hand there is a delayed reaction to qualitative warnings on day one. The 
delayed market reaction for qualitative warnings is -2.1% (-1.88%) and is 
significant at a 5%-level. The fact that the delayed market reaction is greater for 
qualitative warnings than quantitative may be because investors need longer time 
to analyze qualitative announcements; hence some of the adjustment is 
incorporated in the price the next day. The findings may therefore still support the 
claim that warnings with more detailed forecasts reduce the uncertainty embedded 
in profit warnings and correct the prices faster to the new equilibrium level. Some 
of the decline in uncertainty can be ascribed to the reduction in asymmetric 
information between the management of the company and the market.  
 
There is no evidence of post-announcement drift in either of the two subsamples, 
as the mean and median CARs are found to be insignificant for both subsamples 
in the post-event window [+2, +22]. This implies that the market fully incorporate 
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the new information and revise their estimates within the following day. The 
reaction to the qualitative warnings is surprisingly slow, but as discussed it can be 
due to the lack of sufficient information and greater uncertainty.   
6.4 Market Response to Good and Bad News 
The sample has been divided into negative and positive warnings and the results 
are presented in Table 8. Panel D display announcements that are classified as 
negative, while Panel E include those classified as positive. Looking at the 
subsamples it is apparent that there are substantially more negative warnings than 
positive. The sample size of 50 positive warnings is nevertheless sufficient to 
draw valid inferences. Comparing the subsample consisting of positive warnings 
with the subsample including negative warnings reveals some interesting aspects. 
The market reaction to negative profit warnings is almost twice as large as the 
reaction to positive warnings in the main event window, -11.05% CAAR versus 
5.97% CAAR, significant at a 0.1%-level.  
 
These findings confirm the view that investors on average react stronger to bad 
news than good news. The implications from this finding are induced incentives 
for earnings management and investor irrationality. The results indicate that 
failure to meet investors’ earnings expectations is penalized harder than the 
market reward news that exceeds the expectations. This imposes an incentive for 
the management to make sure that expectations are met, thereby managing 
earnings upwards (Scott 2012). It could also reflect that managers are more eager 
to disclose positive news than negative, resulting in asymmetric information 
content between positive and negative warnings. Rational investors are aware of 
these incentives and actions taken by the management. The presence of bad news 
will therefore be a confirmation of poor future profitability. With respect to 
investor irrationality, evidence of dissimilar reactions to good and bad news 
indicates a separate evaluation of gains and losses, which deviates from 
conventional decision theory (Scott 2012). This separate evaluation reflects that 
investors are loss-averse and dislike losses more than they appreciate equally 
sized gains, but the differences could also be due to asymmetric information 
content.  
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Event Mean Median t-stat Corrado
 Window  CAR  CAR  cross-sec.  Rank
[ - 2, + 2] 134 -10,98 % -8,64 % 17 / 117 -9,57 *** -17,95 *** -6,73 *** -10,39 ***
[ - 1, +1 ] 134 -11,05 % -8,13 % 18 / 116 -9,66 *** -23,15 *** -8,48 *** -10,21 ***
[ - 1] 134 -0,02 % -0,08 % 75 / 59 -0,07 -0,07 -0,20 -0,26
[ 0 ] 134 -9,50 % -7,07 % 18 / 116 -8,68 *** -34,39 *** -11,13 *** -10,21 ***
[ + 1] 134 -1,53 % -1,11 % 52 / 82 -3,50 *** -5,64 *** -3,36 *** -4,28 ***
[ + 2, + 22] 134 -0,57 % 0,27 % 69 / 65 -0,28 -1,17 -1,33 -1,31
Panel E: Positive
Event N Mean Median t-stat Patell-Z Corrado Sign test
 Window  CAR  CAR  cross-sec.  Rank
[ - 2, + 2] 50 5,34 % 5,70 % 36 / 14 4,86 *** 5,22 *** 2,09 * 1,97
[ - 1, +1 ] 50 5,97 % 4,16 % 37 / 13 5,63 *** 7,61 *** 3,76 *** 2,26 *
[ - 1] 50 -0,07 % -0,15 % 28 / 22 -0,20 -0,18 -0,54 -0,32
[ 0 ] 50 5,89 % 4,23 % 41 / 9 6,19 *** 12,90 *** 6,34 *** 3,41 **
[ + 1] 50 0,16 % 0,19 % 32 / 18 0,35 0,46 0,72 0,54
[ + 2, + 22] 50 1,42 % -2,01 % 23 / 27 0,60 0,01 0,37 -2,17 *
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0,1%, 1% and 5% -level respectively
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0,1%, 1% and 5% -level respectively
Pos / Neg
Panel D: Negative
N Pos / Neg Patell-Z Sign test
Table 8: Negative and Positive PWs 2005-2012
N is the number of companies in the sample for a given event window.  The column "Pos / Neg" shows the 
number of observations with positive and negative abnormal returns during the event windows. T-stat 
cross-sectional and Patell-Z are parametric tests, while Corrado Rank test and Sign test are non-parametric 
tests.  ***, **,* indicates the level of significance for mean CARs. Panel D shows the cumulative average 
abnormal return (CAAR) and median cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for Profit Warnings characterized
as negative in the stated event windows.  Panel E shows CAAR and Median CARs for positive PWs.
 
We further notice that there are no significant abnormal returns prior to the event 
date, implying no information leakage in either subsample. Another interesting 
feature is that many of the warnings results in a market response in the opposite 
direction of what was expected. Column 5 in panel E reveals that 9 out of the 50 
positive warnings yielded negative mean CARs on the announcement day. Further 
investigation detected that these warnings had small negative abnormal returns on 
the announcement day. The small impact on the stock price is probably because 
the warnings provided little new information, or because they included both 
positive and negative news which cancelled each other out and made it difficult to 
interpret the overall effect.  Another explanation is that the market expectations 
prior to the announcement date could be based upon estimates which deviated 
substantially from the warning, and despite positive news, they could be lower 
than anticipated and thereby cause a negative price effect. The subjective 
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assessment we applied when we separated between positive and negative 
warnings was not based upon a market proxy. We also notice that there are less 
negative CARs among the profit warnings classified as positive at the 
announcement date than for the other event windows. This feature is desirable as 
we expected that most of the reaction would occur at the announcement date, and 
that abnormal returns on other days are less prominent and thereby more random.  
 
Considering the speed of adjustment after the disclosure, there seems to be a 
slower reaction to negative news. There is a significant negative CAAR of 1.53% 
the day after the announcement, shown in Panel D, while no significant post-
announcement abnormal returns can be found in Panel E. A possible explanation 
to this could be that the management issue negative warnings concealed together 
with positive information to reduce the negative impact associated with bad news. 
Consequently, the market requires longer time to interpret and react to the new 
information. Efforts to conceal information would be detected and securities 
priced correctly in an efficient market. Overall, the slow market reaction to 
negative profit warnings increases the disparity between the two classifications, as 
no delayed market reaction is found for positive profit warnings. The analysis 
does not detect any significant post-announcement drift in Panel D, but there 
seems to be conflicting evidence of continuing positive drift and partial reversal in 
Panel E. The mean CAR for the post-event window is 1.42%, while the median 
CAR is found to be -2.01%. Considering the positive warnings, the reason for the 
distorted results is that the distribution is found to be positively skewed (skewness 
of 0.51) with some negative outliers. The CARs are in any case not statistically 
significant. 
6.5 Profit Warnings Divided into Deciles  
After calculating the abnormal returns for all events, the profit warnings have 
been divided into deciles based upon market impact, measured by the abnormal 
returns in the main event window. The profit warnings are ranked from lowest to 
highest, where six of the portfolios include 18 companies and four portfolios 
consist of 19 companies. The reasoning behind this approach is to examine the 
level of CAR and investigate whether there are any post-announcement 
differences between the deciles. Since we found some extreme reactions, it is 
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particularly interesting to test whether some of the reaction is reversed or if it 
continues to drift in the same direction. Decile 1 and 10 are thus of great interest. 
 
Figure 4: CAAR for Different Deciles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results are presented in Figure 4 and Table 9. The portfolios are ranked from 
lowest CAAR, i.e. D1, to highest CAAR, i.e. D10, and Table 9 displays the 
different CAARs in the event window and for the post-event window. Most of the 
CAARs in the event window are significant at a 0.1%-level, except from D8, 
which includes companies that experienced modest reaction in the event window. 
There are only two deciles which have significant abnormal returns in the post-
event window. The graph reveals that D5 has a continuing downward drift after 
the negative market reaction in the event window, indicating a gradual market 
response. The post-announcement drift cumulates into a negative CAAR of 12.9% 
from day two until day 22, and is significant at a 0.1%-level. Another decile 
which has an underreaction is D8, which consist of companies that experienced 
small CAAR in the event window. The continuing drift cumulates to a CAAR of 
6.1% and is found to be significant at a 5%-level. The rationale for the price drift 
in these two deciles cannot be explained by the characteristics of the companies or 
the composition of the deciles. 
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The overall consensus is that there is no clear pattern for abnormal returns 
between the deciles in the post-event window, and Figure 4 illustrates this. Two of 
the deciles have significant post-announcement abnormal returns, but there exist 
no obvious theoretical justification for why these two deciles should exhibit 
continuing drift. The results could simply be due to chance, or heavily influenced 
by one or two extreme observation because the sample size in each decile is 
relative small. No significant overreaction and price-reversal is found in any of the 
deciles. These results support the EMH and the findings in Figure 3, i.e. the 
market has in most cases fully revised the information within the event window.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
Decile
D1 -34.4 % *** 4.0 %
D2 -17.0 % *** -6.1 %
D3 -13.4 % *** 0.1 %
D4 -9.2 % *** -1.2 %
D5 -6.5 % *** -12.9 % ***
D6 -3.9 % *** 1.0 %
D7 -1.2 % *** 1.0 %
D8 1.1 % 6.1 % *
D9 5.8 % *** -0.1 %
D10 14.2 % *** 2.7 %
(***,** and * indicate significance on a 0.1%-, 1%- and 5%-level)
CAAR [+2, +22]CAAR [-1, +1]
Table 9: PWs Divided Into Deciles
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7. Summary and Conclusions 
The main objective of this paper is to scrutinize the extent of market rationality in 
response to profit warning announcements. By estimating abnormal returns in the 
period around the event date, we examine the magnitude of the price reaction, the 
timing of the market reaction and the speed of adjustment to new information. 
Due to the unexpected nature of profit warnings they are an effective field of 
study to test the degree of market efficiency and to investigate whether there are 
any disparities in market reaction between different types of information 
disclosures.  
 
We find no evidence of cross-sectional information leakage in the dataset, which 
clearly indicates that the market did not anticipate the news or that insiders 
desisted from exploiting an informational advantage. The mean CAR for the total 
sample is -6.36% in the main event window, while the mean CAR at the 
announcement date is -5.25%. In terms of absolute values, the mean CAR is 9.1% 
at the announcement date, which is roughly the same as what other studies have 
found. We provide evidence of a quick and rational response to new information 
and the magnitude of the abnormal returns implies high power of the study. To 
test for post-announcement drift we employed a post-event window, but found no 
evidence of momentum or reversal effects within the sample. All price 
adjustments accrue within the main event window, consistent with the efficient 
market hypothesis. The graphical representation of the CAAR for the event 
window resembles the semi-strong reaction almost perfectly, suggesting that the 
information conveyed in the announcements is adequate and that the market 
responds rationally.  
 
After distinguishing between quantitative and qualitative warnings we report that 
the former have a greater market reaction, thus contrary to what we expected. 
There are no signs of overreaction to qualitative warnings. Some of the difference 
has diminished the day after the announcement, which suggests that qualitative 
warnings experience a delayed market reaction, but that this inertia is captured 
within the event window. The delayed market reaction for the qualitative 
warnings at day one is 2.1% and significant. A rational explanation to this is less 
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uncertainty embedded in quantitative warnings due to more accurate and detailed 
forecasts of future profitability. These findings suggests that the qualitative 
warnings are more difficult to interpret or it could indicate that the market not 
respond as efficiently as expected.  
 
Abnormal returns following negative profit warnings are almost twice as high as 
abnormal returns following positive profit warnings, with mean CARs of -11.05% 
and 5.97% respectively. The fact that investors react stronger to bad news than to 
good news implies that the information content in negative warnings on average is 
more severe and of greater importance or that investors are loss-averse. The 
overall conclusion in our thesis is that the Norwegian stock market’s response to 
profit warnings is in line with the semi-strong form of market efficiency.  
 
Limitations and shortcomings in this study relates to the availability of data, 
parameter estimation and to the sample size. The information in each individual 
profit warning is unique, and stating something general based upon specific events 
should be done with caution. The manual assessment of each individual warning 
could be a weakness in this study. Sorting and separating the profit warnings from 
other news and the subjective classification of the warnings could lead to errors. 
This study does not measure the element of surprise in the announcement. An 
improvement of the model design would be to incorporate market expectations 
through analyst forecasts. Another shortcoming in this study is related to the 
parameter estimation. The inefficient coefficients imply that we cannot draw any 
inferences regarding the statistical significance of the parameters, but that the 
coefficients on average are equal to their true values. A final weakness is the 
relatively small sample size compared to studies performed in other countries. The 
statistical power of the study is high, but the numbers of profit warnings within 
the subsamples are lower and the issue more imminent.  
 
Suggestions for future research are to employ a proxy for market expectations 
based on analyst forecasts and perhaps to design a warnings response coefficient. 
Another interesting feature would be a study focusing on personnel responsible 
for investor relations, such that motivation and decisive factors for disclosing 
information could be further investigated. 
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9. Appendix 
Appendix 1: Rules Regarding Information Disclosure at OSE 
3.1 Inside information 
3.1.1 The content of the duty to provide information 
“(1) The company shall without delay and on its own initiative publicly disclose 
inside information that concerns the company directly, cf. Section 3-2, first to 
third paragraphs, of the Securities Trading Act.  
(2) Inside information shall mean any information of a precise nature relating to 
financial instruments, the issuer thereof or other circumstances which has not been 
made public and is not commonly known in the market and which is likely to 
have a significant effect on the price of those financial instruments or of related 
financial instruments.  
(3) Information shall be deemed to be of a precise nature if it indicates 
circumstances that exist or may reasonably be expected to come into existence or 
an event that has occurred or may reasonably be expected to occur and which is 
specific enough to enable a conclusion to be drawn as to the possible effect of 
those circumstances or that event on the price of the financial instruments or 
related financial instruments”… 
 
3.1.4 Duty of prior notice when publicly disclosing particularly price-
sensitive events 
 
If the company, at any time during the exchange’s opening hours, is to 
publicly disclose information on a take-over bid or a profit warning or other 
specific matters that must be assumed to have a significant effect on its share 
price, it must contact Oslo Børs prior to making such public disclosure. In 
view of the interests of investors, it is necessary for the company and Oslo Børs to 
collaborate on the publication of such price-sensitive information. Oslo Børs 
wishes to stress that the duty to give prior notice is separate and additional to the 
duty to notify Oslo Børs of a decision to delay publication pursuant to section 
3.1.2, third paragraph. Announcements of profits warnings and takeover bids will 
always trigger a duty of prior notice, and the impact on prices typically associated 
with such announcements can 
provide guidance when evaluating what kind of other information which should 
also trigger this duty. In other words, this duty does not apply to general 
announcements of a price-sensitive nature, but only to announcements of a 
particularly price-sensitive character, where the effect on the share price must be 
assumed to be so considerable that a matching halt should be considered in the 
best interest of the investor market”... 
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Title: TTS - Profit Warning
Date/time 02.11.2009 08:09
Classification:
Negative
Quantitative
Alpha -0,01
Beta 0,79
Std error 0,06
t-stat 14,18
CAR [-1, +1] -13,98 %
OLS-Estimates
Event window
Profit Warning TTS 02.11.2009
TTS warns of a weak result in the third quarter, due to further provisions in connection 
with the bankruptcy of Wadan shipyard and increased development cost in TTS' Energy 
division.
The German yard Wadan went bankrupt in the second quarter this year. TTS undertook 
write-downs of NOK 6m in Q2. Based on a legal opinion of the accounts receivable, and an 
evaluation of produced, but not delivered equipment, TTS has booked NOK 20m in 
provision for losses in the third quarter.
Furthermore, TTS has booked NOK 20m in development cost on drilling packages for jack-
up rigs and bigger offshore cranes during the quarter.
The preliminary review of the results for Q3 forcast is a turnover of NOK 900m and a 
negative EBITDA of NOK 10m.
TTS will give the details of circumstances regarding the profit developments during third 
quarter at the announced presentation of the Group's results at Grand Hotel, Oslo 5 
November 08:15.
Appendix 2: Example of Profit Warning (TTS Group) 
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Nr. Date Company Ticker Sector Pos. vs. Neg. Quantitative?
1 05.01.2005 Rieber & Søn ASA RIE Consumer Staples Negative Yes
2 10.01.2005 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA TGS Energy Positive Yes
3 19.01.2005 Acergy ACY Energy Positive Yes
4 20.01.2005 Atea ASA ATEA IT Negative Yes
5 31.01.2005 Nordic Semiconductor ASA NOD IT Negative Yes
6 02.02.2005 Stolt-Nielsen Limited SNI Industry Positive Yes
7 02.02.2005 Jinhui Shipping and Transport JIN Industry Positive No
8 02.02.2005 NextGenTel Holding ASA NEXT Telecom Negative No
9 04.02.2005 Technor TEC Energy Negative Yes
10 06.04.2005 Roxar ASA ROX Energy Negative Yes
11 18.04.2005 Atea ASA ATEA IT Negative Yes
12 29.04.2005 Hjellegjerde ASA HJE Consumer Staples Negative Yes
13 26.05.2005 Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. RCL Consumer Discretionary Negative Yes
14 09.06.2005 Agasti Holding ASA AGA Financials Positive Yes
15 20.06.2005 Expert ASA EXPERT Consumer Discretionary Negative Yes
16 04.07.2005 ContextVision AB COV Health Care Positive Yes
17 08.07.2005 StepStone ASA STP IT Positive Yes
18 02.09.2005 Birdstep Technology ASA BIRD IT Negative No
19 29.09.2005 Nordic Semiconductor ASA NOD IT Negative Yes
20 29.09.2005 Tandberg Data ASA TAD IT Positive Yes
21 03.10.2005 Active 24 ACTIVE IT Negative Yes
22 05.10.2005 Expert ASA EXPERT Consumer Discretionary Negative Yes
23 10.10.2005 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA TGS Energy Positive Yes
24 13.10.2005 Belships ASA BEL Industry Negative No
25 16.12.2005 Tandberg ASA TAA IT Negative Yes
26 09.01.2006 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA TGS Energy Negative Yes
27 29.03.2006 Blom ASA BLO IT Negative Yes
28 31.03.2006 Fjord Seafood ASA FJO Consumer Staples Positive Yes
29 21.04.2006 Kitron ASA KIT IT Positive No
30 03.07.2006 Agasti Holding ASA AGA Financials Positive Yes
31 10.07.2006 Altinex ASA ALX Energy Negative No
32 10.07.2006 Vmetro ASA VME IT Negative Yes
33 10.07.2006 Software Innovation ASA SOI IT Negative No
34 15.08.2006 Jason Shipping ASA (CECO ASA) JSHIP Industry Negative No
35 06.09.2006 Tandberg Television ASA TAT IT Negative Yes
36 03.10.2006 Bionor Pharma ASA BIONOR Health Care Negative Yes
37 05.10.2006 ContextVision AB COV Health Care Negative Yes
38 09.10.2006 Simrad Optronics ASA SIT IT Negative No
39 19.10.2006 Synnøve Finden ASA SFM Consumer Staples Negative No
40 20.10.2006 Renewable Energy Corporation ASA REC IT Positive Yes
41 30.10.2006 Tandberg Data TAD IT Negative Yes
42 29.11.2006 Acergy S.A ACY Energy Negative Yes
43 12.12.2006 PSI Group ASA PSI IT Positive Yes
44 12.12.2006 Kverneland ASA KVE Industry Negative No
45 21.12.2006 Synnøve Finden ASA SFM Consumer Staples Negative Yes
46 11.01.2007 Q-Free ASA QFR IT Negative Yes
47 22.01.2007 Veidekke ASA VEI Industry Positive Yes
48 29.01.2007 Norsk Hydro ASA NHY Materials Negative Yes
49 27.03.2007 Vmetro ASA VME IT Negative Yes
50 28.03.2007 ContextVision AB COV Health Care Negative No
List of Companies with Profit Warnings from 01.01.2005 to 31.12.2013
o. t i t . . . tit ti
Appendix 3: List of Profit Warnings from 01.01.2005 to 31.12.2012  
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51 12.04.2007 StepStone ASA STP Industry Positive Yes
52 13.04.2007 Bionor Pharma ASA BIONOR Health Care Negative Yes
53 19.04.2007 Tandberg Storage ASA TST IT Negative No
54 23.04.2007 OTRUM ASA OTR IT Positive Yes
55 09.05.2007 Hexagon Composites ASA HEX Industry Negative No
56 19.06.2007 Profdoc ASA PRO IT Negative No
57 25.06.2007 Kongsberg Automotive Holding ASA KOA Consumer Discretionary Negative No
58 06.07.2007 STX Europe AS STXEUR Energy Negative Yes
59 13.07.2007 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA TGS Energy Negative Yes
60 27.07.2007 Fast Search & Transfer ASA FAST IT Negative Yes
61 27.07.2007 Norwegian Property ASA NPRO Consumer Discretionary Positive Yes
62 03.08.2007 Exense ASA EXE IT Negative Yes
63 13.09.2007 Norske Skogindustrier ASA NSG Materials Negative Yes
64 18.09.2007 ContextVision AB COV Health Care Positive No
65 05.10.2007 Agasti Holding ASA AGA Financials Negative Yes
66 09.10.2007 StepStone ASA STP Industry Positive Yes
67 09.10.2007 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA TGS Energy Negative No
68 09.10.2007 DNB ASA DNB Financials Negative Yes
69 09.10.2007 Software Innovation ASA SOI IT Negative Yes
70 17.10.2007 Marine Harvest ASA MHG Consumer Staples Negative Yes
71 17.10.2007 Renewable Energy Corporation ASA REC IT Negative Yes
72 17.10.2007 OTRUM ASA OTR IT Negative Yes
73 09.11.2007 Ekornes ASA EKO Consumer Discretionary Negative Yes
74 29.11.2007 Acergy A.S ACY Energy Negative Yes
75 03.12.2007 Norske Skogindustrier ASA NSG Materials Negative Yes
76 18.12.2007 STX Europe AS STXEUR Energy Negative Yes
77 18.12.2007 Tandberg Data ASA TAD IT Negative Yes
78 20.12.2007 Veidekke ASA VEI Industry Positive Yes
79 07.01.2008 Bluewater Insurance ASA UNISON Financials Negative Yes
80 14.01.2008 Agasti Holding ASA AGA Financials Positive Yes
81 16.01.2008 StepStone ASA STP Industry Positive Yes
82 24.01.2008 Cermaq ASA CEQ Consumer Staples Negative Yes
83 28.01.2008 Schibsted ASA SCH Industry Negative Yes
84 28.01.2008 Kitron ASA KIT IT Negative Yes
85 31.01.2008 Petroleum Geo-Services ASA PGS Energy Negative Yes
86 31.01.2008 Faktor Eiendom ASA FAKTOR Consumer Discretionary Negative Yes
87 01.02.2008 OTRUM ASA OTR IT Negative Yes
88 01.02.2008 Hexagon Composites ASA HEX Industry Negative No
89 14.02.2008 Roxar ASA ROX Energy Negative Yes
90 19.02.2008 SeaBird Exploration PLC SBX Energy Negative Yes
91 11.03.2008 Norske Skogindustrier ASA NSG Materials Negative No
92 08.04.2008 Wintershall Norge ASA WNOR Energy Positive Yes
93 14.04.2008 Navamedic ASA NAVA Health Care Negative Yes
94 17.04.2008 Wavefield Inseis ASA WAVE Energy Negative Yes
95 18.04.2008 Cermaq ASA CEQ Consumer Staples Negative Yes
96 21.04.2008 Roxar ASA ROX Energy Positive Yes
97 30.04.2008 TECO Maritime ASA TECO Industry Negative Yes
98 17.06.2008 Kitron ASA KIT IT Positive Yes
99 30.06.2008 Axis-Shield plc ASD Health Care Positive Yes
100 02.07.2008 Songa Offshore SE SONG Energy Positive Yes
No. Date Company Ticker Sector Pos. vs. Neg. Quantitative?
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101 04.07.2008 Electromagnetic Geoservices ASA EMGS Energy Negative Yes
102 08.07.2008 Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA NAS Industry Negative Yes
103 14.07.2008 Norsk Hydro ASA NHY Materials Negative Yes
104 21.07.2008 Cermaq ASA CEQ Consumer Staples Negative Yes
105 13.08.2008 Protector Forsikring ASA PROTCT Financials Negative Yes
106 15.08.2008 Codfarmers ASA COD Consumer Staples Negative Yes
107 22.09.2008 Software Innovation ASA SOI IT Negative No
108 02.10.2008 Protector Forsikring ASA PROTCT Financials Negative Yes
109 07.10.2008 ContextVision AB COV Health Care Negative No
110 16.10.2008 Ignis ASA IGNIS IT Positive Yes
111 17.10.2008 Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA NAS Industry Positive Yes
112 23.10.2008 Kitron ASA KIT IT Positive No
113 31.10.2008 Codfarmers ASA COD Consumer Staples Negative No
114 05.11.2008 Hafslund ASA HAFS Energy Negative Yes
115 18.12.2008 PSI Group ASA PSI IT Positive Yes
116 19.12.2008 Storebrand ASA STB Financials Positive No
117 05.01.2009 Grieg Seafood ASA GSF Consumer Staples Negative Yes
118 12.01.2009 Cermaq ASA CEQ Consumer Staples Negative Yes
119 19.01.2009 Aker Solutions ASA AKSO Energy Negative Yes
120 28.01.2009 Norsk Hydro ASA NHY Materials Negative Yes
121 30.01.2009 Schibsted ASA SCH Consumer Discretionary Negative Yes
122 19.02.2009 Jason Shipping ASA JSHIP Industry Negative Yes
123 25.02.2009 Reservoir Exploration Technology ASA RXT Energy Negative Yes
124 27.03.2009 TeleComputing ASA TCO Telecom Positive No
125 02.04.2009 NattoPharma ASA NATTO Health Care Positive No
126 28.04.2009 Vizrt Ltd. VIZ IT Negative Yes
127 30.04.2009 Veidekke ASA VEI Industry Negative Yes
128 05.05.2009 Simtronics ASA SIMTRO IT Negative Yes
129 08.06.2009 FARA ASA FARA IT Positive No
130 30.06.2009 Data Respons ASA DAT IT Positive Yes 
131 29.07.2009 Odim ASA ODIM Energy Negative Yes
132 18.08.2009 Codfarmers ASA COD Consumer Staples Negative Yes
133 02.11.2009 TTS Group ASA TTS Industry Negative Yes
134 25.01.2010 BWG Homes ASA BWG Consumer Discretionary Positive Yes
135 05.02.2010 Seadrill Limited SDRL Energy Positive Yes
136 22.02.2010 TTS Group ASA TTS Industry Negative Yes
137 24.02.2010 Veidekke ASA VEI Industry Negative Yes
138 12.03.2010 Kitron ASA KIT IT Negative Yes
139 31.05.2010 Wilh. Wilhelmsen Holding ASA WWI Industry Positive No
140 17.09.2010 Nordic Semiconductor ASA NOD IT Negative Yes
141 30.09.2010 EVRY ASA EVRY IT Negative Yes
142 11.10.2010 Eltek ASA ELT IT Negative Yes
143 12.10.2010 Norsk Hydro ASA NHY Materials Negative Yes
144 20.10.2010 Q-Free ASA QFR IT Negative Yes
145 21.12.2010 Blom ASA BLO IT Negative No
146 28.12.2010 Protector Forsikring ASA PROTCT Financials Positive No
147 11.01.2011 SeaBird Exploration PLC SBX Energy Negative No
148 24.01.2011 EVRY ASA EVRY IT Negative Yes
149 26.01.2011 Sølvtrans Holding ASA STRANS Consumer Staples Negative Yes
150 27.01.2011 Protector Forsikring ASA PROTCT Financials Positive Yes
No. Date Company Ticker Sector Pos. vs. Neg. Quantitative?
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151 04.02.2011 Yara International ASA YAR Materials Negative Yes
152 04.02.2011 Electromagnetic Geoservices ASA EMGS Energy Negative Yes
153 14.04.2011 Petroleum Geo-Services ASA PGS Energy Negative Yes
154 15.04.2011 ORIGIO a/s ORO Health Care Positive Yes
155 20.05.2011 EVRY ASA EVRY IT Negative Yes
156 17.06.2011 Aker Solutions ASA AKSO Energy Negative Yes
157 24.06.2011 Comrod Communication ASA COMRODIT Negative No
158 15.07.2011 Petroleum Geo-Services ASA PGS Energy Positive Yes
159 23.08.2011 Nordic Semiconductor ASA NOD IT Negative Yes
160 11.10.2011 Aker Solutions ASA AKSO Energy Negative Yes
161 14.10.2011 Kongsberg Automotive Holding ASA KOA Industry Negative Yes
162 18.10.2011 Spectrum ASA SPU Energy Positive No
163 06.01.2012 Spectrum ASA SPU Energy Positive No
164 09.01.2012 Birdstep Technology ASA BIRD IT Negative No
165 25.01.2012 Protector Forsikring ASA PROTCT Financials Positive Yes
166 01.02.2012 Norsk Hydro ASA NHY Materials Negative Yes
167 06.02.2012 SeaBird Exploration PLC SBX Energy Negative Yes
168 08.02.2012 DNO International ASA DNO Energy Positive Yes
169 28.02.2012 Blom ASA BLO IT Negative Yes
170 04.05.2012 Bergen Group ASA BERGEN Industry Negative No
171 08.05.2012 Jinhui Shipping and Transport. Ltd JIN Industry Negative No
172 03.07.2012 Vizrt Ltd. VIZ IT Negative Yes
173 17.07.2012 Petroleum Geo-Services ASA PGS Energy Positive Yes
174 19.07.2012 BW Offshore Limited BWO Energy Negative Yes
175 14.08.2012 Bergen Group ASA BERGEN Industry Negative Yes
176 27.09.2012 Odfjell SE ODF Energy Negative Yes
177 17.10.2012 Electromagnetic Geoservices ASA EMGS Energy Negative Yes
178 26.10.2012 Dolphin Group ASA DOLPH Energy Positive Yes
179 30.10.2012 Bergen Group ASA BERGEN Industry Negative Yes
180 20.11.2012 BW Offshore Limited BWO Energy Negative Yes
181 23.11.2012 Repant ASA REPANT Industry Negative No
182 26.11.2012 Archer Limited ARCHER Energy Negative Yes
183 13.12.2012 Nordic Semiconductor ASA NOD IT Negative Yes
184 17.12.2012 Scana Industrier ASA SCI Materials Negative No
No. Date Company Ticker Sector Pos. vs. Neg. Quantitative?
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No. Date Company White's-test Heteroscedasticity DW Autocorrelation
1 05.01.2005 Rieber & Søn ASA 0,002 Yes 2,62 Yes
2 10.01.2005 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA 0,018 Ambiguous 1,63 No
3 19.01.2005 Acergy 0,014 Yes 2,00 No
4 20.01.2005 Atea ASA 0,000 Ambiguous 2,09 No
5 31.01.2005 Nordic Semiconductor ASA 0,990 No 2,06 No
6 02.02.2005 Stolt-Nielsen Limited 0,000 Yes 2,22 No
7 02.02.2005 Jinhui Shipping and Transport 0,179 No 1,68 No
8 02.02.2005 NextGenTel Holding ASA 0,890 No 2,39 No
9 04.02.2005 Technor 0,001 Ambiguous 2,12 No
10 06.04.2005 Roxar ASA 0,905 No 2,46 Inconclusive
11 18.04.2005 Atea ASA 0,000 Ambiguous 2,19 No
12 29.04.2005 Hjellegjerde ASA 0,270 No 1,99 No
13 26.05.2005 Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. 0,054 No 1,94 No
14 09.06.2005 Agasti Holding ASA 0,089 No 1,82 No
15 20.06.2005 Expert ASA 0,460 No 2,06 No
16 04.07.2005 ContextVision AB 0,076 No 2,06 No
17 08.07.2005 StepStone ASA 0,000 Ambiguous 2,25 No
18 02.09.2005 Birdstep Technology ASA 0,061 No 1,95 No
19 29.09.2005 Nordic Semiconductor ASA 0,028 Ambiguous 2,14 No
20 29.09.2005 Tandberg Data ASA 0,068 No 2,21 No
21 03.10.2005 Active 24 0,420 No 1,80 No
22 05.10.2005 Expert ASA 0,900 No 1,73 No
23 10.10.2005 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA 0,000 Ambiguous 1,89 No
24 13.10.2005 Belships ASA 0,780 No 2,06 No
25 16.12.2005 Tandberg ASA 0,000 Yes 2,12 No
26 09.01.2006 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA 0,400 No 2,03 No
27 29.03.2006 Blom ASA 0,920 No 2,16 No
28 31.03.2006 Fjord Seafood ASA 0,005 Ambiguous 2,14 No
29 21.04.2006 Kitron ASA 0,100 No 2,05 No
30 03.07.2006 Agasti Holding ASA 0,007 Yes 1,94 No
31 10.07.2006 Altinex ASA 0,180 No 2,26 No
32 10.07.2006 Vmetro ASA 0,690 No 2,67 Yes
33 10.07.2006 Software Innovation ASA 0,660 No 2,12 No
34 15.08.2006 Jason Shipping ASA (CECO ASA) 0,400 No 2,23 No
35 06.09.2006 Tandberg Television ASA 0,260 No 1,81 No
36 03.10.2006 Bionor Pharma ASA 0,095 No 2,45 Inconclusive
37 05.10.2006 ContextVision AB 0,610 No 2,39 No
38 09.10.2006 Simrad Optronics ASA 0,000 Ambiguous 2,36 No
39 19.10.2006 Synnøve Finden ASA 0,390 No 2,12 No
40 20.10.2006 Renewable Energy Corporation ASA 0,000 Yes 1,99 No
41 30.10.2006 Tandberg Data 0,830 No 2,18 No
42 29.11.2006 Acergy S.A 0,012 Yes 2,25 No
43 12.12.2006 PSI Group ASA 0,051 No 2,54 Yes
44 12.12.2006 Kverneland ASA 0,430 No 1,93 No
45 21.12.2006 Synnøve Finden ASA 0,560 No 2,02 No
46 11.01.2007 Q-Free ASA 0,212 No 2,18 No
47 22.01.2007 Veidekke ASA 0,000 Yes 2,04 No
48 29.01.2007 Norsk Hydro ASA 0,000 Ambiguous 2,00 No
49 27.03.2007 Vmetro ASA 0,400 No 2,28 No
50 28.03.2007 ContextVision AB 0,009 Yes 2,32 No
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51 12.04.2007 StepStone ASA 0,434 No 2,18 No
52 13.04.2007 Bionor Pharma ASA 0,030 Ambiguous 2,03 No
53 19.04.2007 Tandberg Storage ASA 0,027 Ambiguous 2,29 No
54 23.04.2007 OTRUM ASA 0,390 No 2,11 No
55 09.05.2007 Hexagon Composites ASA 0,280 No 2,27 No
56 19.06.2007 Profdoc ASA 0,280 No 2,90 Yes
57 25.06.2007 Kongsberg Automotive Holding ASA 0,098 No 2,67 Yes
58 06.07.2007 STX Europe AS 0,017 Ambiguous 2,07 No
59 13.07.2007 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA 0,230 No 2,41 No
60 27.07.2007 Fast Search & Transfer ASA 0,260 No 1,58 No
61 27.07.2007 Norwegian Property ASA 0,300 No 1,87 No
62 03.08.2007 Exense ASA 0,470 No 2,14 No
63 13.09.2007 Norske Skogindustrier ASA 0,370 No 2,36 No
64 18.09.2007 ContextVision AB 0,840 No 2,28 No
65 05.10.2007 Agasti Holding ASA 0,290 No 1,88 No
66 09.10.2007 StepStone ASA 0,260 No 2,21 No
67 09.10.2007 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA 0,140 No 2,21 No
68 09.10.2007 DNB ASA 0,980 No 2,05 No
69 09.10.2007 Software Innovation ASA 0,480 No 2,53 Yes
70 17.10.2007 Marine Harvest ASA 0,030 Yes 1,89 No
71 17.10.2007 Renewable Energy Corporation ASA 0,390 No 1,93 No
72 17.10.2007 OTRUM ASA 0,420 No 2,40 No
73 09.11.2007 Ekornes ASA 0,136 No 2,65 Yes
74 29.11.2007 Acergy A.S 0,940 No 1,96 no
75 03.12.2007 Norske Skogindustrier ASA 0,620 No 2,04 No
76 18.12.2007 STX Europe AS 0,000 Ambiguous 1,84 No
77 18.12.2007 Tandberg Data ASA 0,000 Yes 1,45 Yes
78 20.12.2007 Veidekke ASA 0,600 No 2,31 No
79 07.01.2008 Bluewater Insurance ASA 0,290 No 2,13 No
80 14.01.2008 Agasti Holding ASA 0,107 No 1,77 No
81 16.01.2008 StepStone ASA 0,340 No 1,91 No
82 24.01.2008 Cermaq ASA 0,700 No 1,85 No
83 28.01.2008 Schibsted ASA 0,340 No 2,13 No
84 28.01.2008 Kitron ASA 0,091 No 2,34 No
85 31.01.2008 Petroleum Geo-Services ASA 0,580 No 2,30 No
86 31.01.2008 Faktor Eiendom ASA 0,450 No 2,03 No
87 01.02.2008 OTRUM ASA 0,110 No 2,58 Yes
88 01.02.2008 Hexagon Composites ASA 0,530 No 2,23 No
89 14.02.2008 Roxar ASA 0,145 No 2,27 No
90 19.02.2008 SeaBird Exploration PLC 0,396 No 1,84 No
91 11.03.2008 Norske Skogindustrier ASA 0,581 No 2,05 No
92 08.04.2008 Wintershall Norge ASA 0,005 Ambiguous 2,13 No
93 14.04.2008 Navamedic ASA 0,583 No 2,48 Inconclusive
94 17.04.2008 Wavefield Inseis ASA 0,047 Ambiguous 2,08 No
95 18.04.2008 Cermaq ASA 0,640 No 1,94 No
96 21.04.2008 Roxar ASA 0,300 No 2,09 No
97 30.04.2008 TECO Maritime ASA 0,890 No 2,35 No
98 17.06.2008 Kitron ASA 0,000 Yes 2,29 No
99 30.06.2008 Axis-Shield plc 0,157 No 2,55 Yes
100 02.07.2008 Songa Offshore SE 0,540 No 2,33 No
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101 04.07.2008 Electromagnetic Geoservices ASA 0,000 Yes 1,66 No
102 08.07.2008 Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA 0,530 No 1,62 No
103 14.07.2008 Norsk Hydro ASA 0,032 Ambiguous 2,01 No
104 21.07.2008 Cermaq ASA 0,350 No 1,91 No
105 13.08.2008 Protector Forsikring ASA 0,730 No 2,39 No
106 15.08.2008 Codfarmers ASA 0,750 No 2,40 No
107 22.09.2008 Software Innovation ASA 0,026 Yes 2,68 Yes
108 02.10.2008 Protector Forsikring ASA 0,410 No 2,25 No
109 07.10.2008 ContextVision AB 0,100 No 1,78 No
110 16.10.2008 Ignis ASA 0,000 Yes 2,32 No
111 17.10.2008 Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA 0,044 Ambiguous 1,72 No
112 23.10.2008 Kitron ASA 0,152 No 2,15 No
113 31.10.2008 Codfarmers ASA 0,750 No 2,40 No
114 05.11.2008 Hafslund ASA 0,015 Ambiguous 2,45 Inconclusive
115 18.12.2008 PSI Group ASA 0,000 Yes 2,03 No
116 19.12.2008 Storebrand ASA 0,000 Yes 2,07 No
117 05.01.2009 Grieg Seafood ASA 0,000 Yes 2,39 No
118 12.01.2009 Cermaq ASA 0,000 Yes 1,88 No
119 19.01.2009 Aker Solutions ASA 0,000 Yes 1,88 No
120 28.01.2009 Norsk Hydro ASA 0,001 Ambiguous 2,31 No
121 30.01.2009 Schibsted ASA 0,170 No 2,30 No
122 19.02.2009 Jason Shipping ASA 0,000 Yes 2,24 No
123 25.02.2009 Reservoir Exploration Technology ASA 0,170 No 2,03 no
124 27.03.2009 TeleComputing ASA 0,000 Yes 3,05 Yes
125 02.04.2009 NattoPharma ASA 0,005 Ambiguous 1,94 No
126 28.04.2009 Vizrt Ltd. 0,083 No 2,13 No
127 30.04.2009 Veidekke ASA 0,000 Yes 2,06 No
128 05.05.2009 Simtronics ASA 0,000 Yes 2,27 No
129 08.06.2009 FARA ASA 0,350 No 2,30 No
130 30.06.2009 Data Respons ASA 0,170 No 2,31 No
131 29.07.2009 Odim ASA 0,000 Yes 1,85 No
132 18.08.2009 Codfarmers ASA 0,380 No 1,82 No
133 02.11.2009 TTS Group ASA 0,240 No 2,30 No
134 25.01.2010 BWG Homes ASA 0,680 No 1,79 No
135 05.02.2010 Seadrill Limited 0,530 No 2,29 No
136 22.02.2010 TTS Group ASA 0,240 No 2,30 No
137 24.02.2010 Veidekke ASA 0,920 No 2,15 No
138 12.03.2010 Kitron ASA 0,440 No 2,25 No
139 31.05.2010 Wilh. Wilhelmsen Holding ASA 0,530 No 1,73 No
140 17.09.2010 Nordic Semiconductor ASA 0,062 No 2,06 No
141 30.09.2010 EVRY ASA 0,063 No 2,49 Yes
142 11.10.2010 Eltek ASA 0,000 Yes 2,23 No
143 12.10.2010 Norsk Hydro ASA 0,970 No 2,35 No
144 20.10.2010 Q-Free ASA 0,330 No 2,20 No
145 21.12.2010 Blom ASA 0,433 No 1,86 No
146 28.12.2010 Protector Forsikring ASA 0,720 No 2,51 Yes
147 11.01.2011 SeaBird Exploration PLC 0,056 No 2,26 No
148 24.01.2011 EVRY ASA 0,041 Ambiguous 2,37 No
149 26.01.2011 Sølvtrans Holding ASA 0,610 No 1,79 No
150 27.01.2011 Protector Forsikring ASA 0,730 No 2,51 Yes
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151 04.02.2011 Yara International ASA 0,796 No 1,95 No
152 04.02.2011 Electromagnetic Geoservices ASA 0,000 Ambiguous 2,37 No
153 14.04.2011 Petroleum Geo-Services ASA 0,910 No 1,96 No
154 15.04.2011 ORIGIO a/s 0,905 No 2,40 No
155 20.05.2011 EVRY ASA 0,017 Ambiguous 2,25 No
156 17.06.2011 Aker Solutions ASA 0,270 No 2,17 No
157 24.06.2011 Comrod Communication ASA 0,520 No 2,98 Yes
158 15.07.2011 Petroleum Geo-Services ASA 0,186 No 1,95 No
159 23.08.2011 Nordic Semiconductor ASA 0,344 No 2,26 No
160 11.10.2011 Aker Solutions ASA 0,000 Ambiguous 2,20 No
161 14.10.2011 Kongsberg Automotive Holding ASA 0,557 No 1,91 No
162 18.10.2011 Spectrum ASA 0,070 No 2,67 Yes
163 06.01.2012 Spectrum ASA 0,001 Yes 2,56 Yes
164 09.01.2012 Birdstep Technology ASA 0,144 No 3,09 Yes
165 25.01.2012 Protector Forsikring ASA 0,830 No 2,65 Yes
166 01.02.2012 Norsk Hydro ASA 0,003 Yes 2,03 No
167 06.02.2012 SeaBird Exploration PLC 0,000 Yes 2,29 No
168 08.02.2012 DNO International ASA 0,015 Ambiguous 2,27 No
169 28.02.2012 Blom ASA 0,000 Yes 2,44 Inconclusive
170 04.05.2012 Bergen Group ASA 0,830 No 2,54 Yes
171 08.05.2012 Jinhui Shipping and Transport. Ltd 0,680 No 2,43 No
172 03.07.2012 Vizrt Ltd. 0,300 No 2,09 No
173 17.07.2012 Petroleum Geo-Services ASA 0,029 Ambiguous 2,18 No
174 19.07.2012 BW Offshore Limited 0,890 No 2,08 No
175 14.08.2012 Bergen Group ASA 0,033 Ambiguous 2,57 Yes
176 27.09.2012 Odfjell SE 0,004 Ambiguous 1,67 No
177 17.10.2012 Electromagnetic Geoservices ASA 0,000 Yes 2,10 No
178 26.10.2012 Dolphin Group ASA 0,670 No 2,36 No
179 30.10.2012 Bergen Group ASA 0,218 No 2,65 Yes
180 20.11.2012 BW Offshore Limited 0,280 No 2,38 No
181 23.11.2012 Repant ASA 0,150 No 2,89 Yes
182 26.11.2012 Archer Limited 0,150 No 2,02 No
183 13.12.2012 Nordic Semiconductor ASA 0,220 No 2,00 No
184 17.12.2012 Scana Industrier ASA 0,097 No 2,45 Inconclusive
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1 Rieber & Søn ASA 0,000          0,305          0,019          16,242      169
2 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA 0,001          1,290          0,023          55,274      233
3 Acergy 0,001          1,622          0,028          58,305      235
4 Atea ASA -0,004         1,719          0,046          37,412      240
5 Nordic Semiconductor ASA 0,006          0,763          0,029          26,124      188
6 Stolt-Nielsen Limited 0,002          1,549          0,021          72,248      237
7 Jinhui Shipping and Transport 0,001          1,474          0,066          22,293      231
8 NextGenTel Holding ASA 0,002          0,599          0,027          22,378      202
9 Technor -0,002         1,269          0,032          39,549      193
10 Roxar ASA 0,000          1,128          0,026          42,945      228
11 Atea ASA -0,004         1,438          0,047          30,395      234
12 Hjellegjerde ASA -0,000         0,217          0,025          8,848        180
13 Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. -0,000         0,541          0,015          35,915      254
14 Agasti Holding ASA 0,003          0,872          0,026          33,743      231
15 Expert ASA 0,002          0,298          0,016          18,526      198
16 ContextVision AB -0,000         1,022          0,044          23,077      133
17 StepStone ASA 0,001          1,311          0,048          27,098      237
18 Birdstep Technology ASA -0,002         0,605          0,041          14,757      236
19 Nordic Semiconductor ASA 0,001          0,728          0,030          24,241      207
20 Tandberg Data ASA 0,000          0,573          0,034          16,859      231
21 Active 24 -0,000         0,726          0,026          27,508      200
22 Expert ASA 0,001          0,375          0,017          21,754      210
23 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA 0,000          1,324          0,023          57,743      234
24 Belships ASA -0,002         1,217          0,028          43,433      224
25 Tandberg ASA -0,003         1,099          0,023          46,920      232
26 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA 0,000          1,480          0,023          63,266      233
27 Blom ASA 0,001          1,383          0,034          41,157      234
28 Fjord Seafood ASA 0,003          1,119          0,031          36,443      240
29 Kitron ASA 0,002          0,432          0,026          16,724      232
30 Agasti Holding ASA 0,001          0,976          0,027          36,651      223
31 Altinex ASA 0,006          1,936          0,063          30,851      181
32 Vmetro ASA 0,001          0,762          0,026          29,163      186
33 Software Innovation ASA 0,000          0,554          0,025          22,534      213
34 Jason Shipping ASA (CECO ASA) -0,000         0,805          0,021          37,552      217
35 Tandberg Television ASA -0,001         0,973          0,023          42,453      240
36 Bionor Pharma ASA -0,002         0,324          0,060          5,447        187
37 ContextVision AB 0,002          0,516          0,030          17,181      191
38 Simrad Optronics ASA 0,003          0,837          0,038          22,236      219
39 Synnøve Finden ASA 0,000          0,375          0,021          17,695      221
40 Renewable Energy Corporation ASA -0,001         1,014          0,030          33,655      108
41 Tandberg Data -0,003         0,725          0,026          28,104      231
42 Acergy S.A 0,001          1,518          0,018          85,449      254
43 PSI Group ASA 0,002          0,558          0,030          18,770      205
44 Kverneland ASA 0,000          0,321          0,028          11,498      127
45 Synnøve Finden ASA -0,001         0,406          0,020          20,782      218
46 Q-Free ASA -0,001         0,893          0,029          30,301      222
47 Veidekke ASA 0,001          0,464          0,021          22,138      235
48 Norsk Hydro ASA -0,000         1,406          0,014          99,967      248
49 Vmetro ASA -0,002         0,594          0,028          21,225      145
50 ContextVision AB -0,001         0,322          0,024          13,569      157
Alpha and Beta is the coefficients estimated from the OLS-regression in the estimation window. Standard error is an 
etimate of  the standard deviation  of the sample. T-stat is the estimated beta divided by the standard error. Days traded 
is number of  trading days during the estimation window. 
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51 StepStone ASA 0,001          0,913          0,030          30,394      217
52 Bionor Pharma ASA 0,000          0,467          0,042          11,065      215
53 Tandberg Storage ASA -0,002         0,953          0,028          33,481      219
54 OTRUM ASA -0,003         0,617          0,038          16,326      181
55 Hexagon Composites ASA 0,003          0,597          0,024          24,399      196
56 Profdoc ASA -0,000         0,529          0,025          21,558      148
57 Kongsberg Automotive Holding ASA -0,000         0,105          0,025          4,230        169
58 STX Europe AS -0,000         0,782          0,022          35,476      243
59 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA -0,001         1,373          0,020          68,347      240
60 Fast Search & Transfer ASA -0,002         0,938          0,023          40,484      230
61 Norwegian Property ASA 0,001          0,672          0,015          43,518      136
62 Exense ASA 0,002          0,014          0,033          0,432        161
63 Norske Skogindustrier ASA -0,002         0,715          0,016          44,841      249
64 ContextVision AB -0,001         -0,247        0,024          -10,343     136
65 Agasti Holding ASA -0,001         1,010          0,020          49,829      236
66 StepStone ASA 0,002          0,741          0,024          31,187      221
67 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA -0,001         1,338          0,019          69,903      244
68 DNB ASA -0,000         0,693          0,011          63,478      238
69 Software Innovation ASA -0,001         0,387          0,029          13,193      212
70 Marine Harvest ASA -0,000         0,840          0,021          40,513      238
71 Renewable Energy Corporation ASA 0,002          1,500          0,022          68,061      245
72 OTRUM ASA -0,000         0,697          0,032          21,714      185
73 Ekornes ASA -0,001         0,292          0,018          16,462      204
74 Acergy A.S -0,000         1,147          0,016          70,105      254
75 Norske Skogindustrier ASA -0,005         0,872          0,025          35,141      249
76 STX Europe AS 0,000          0,921          0,023          40,452      237
77 Tandberg Data ASA -0,004         0,876          0,044          19,759      236
78 Veidekke ASA 0,000          0,886          0,028          31,759      228
79 Bluewater Insurance ASA -0,005         0,339          0,034          10,051      171
80 Agasti Holding ASA -0,002         1,121          0,028          40,514      234
81 StepStone ASA 0,001          0,757          0,026          29,249      227
82 Cermaq ASA -0,001         1,040          0,025          41,491      233
83 Schibsted ASA -0,001         0,794          0,021          38,649      237
84 Kitron ASA -0,002         0,634          0,021          30,230      231
85 Petroleum Geo-Services ASA 0,000          1,377          0,017          79,493      244
86 Faktor Eiendom ASA -0,005         0,758          0,046          16,438      134
87 OTRUM ASA -0,002         0,697          0,035          19,663      174
88 Hexagon Composites ASA -0,002         0,690          0,023          29,400      182
89 Roxar ASA 0,001          0,626          0,021          29,203      229
90 SeaBird Exploration PLC -0,003         1,131          0,037          30,637      226
91 Norske Skogindustrier ASA -0,006         1,130          0,034          32,923      250
92 Wintershall Norge ASA 0,000          0,620          0,025          25,139      226
93 Navamedic ASA -0,002         0,670          0,027          24,686      208
94 Wavefield Inseis ASA -0,001         1,243          0,026          47,562      242
95 Cermaq ASA -0,002         0,896          0,027          33,798      230
96 Roxar ASA -0,002         0,511          0,023          22,499      225
97 TECO Maritime ASA -0,003         0,440          0,022          19,722      204
98 Kitron ASA -0,001         0,593          0,024          24,258      223
99 Axis-Shield plc 0,001          0,286          0,023          12,332      198
100 Songa Offshore SE 0,002          0,931          0,017          54,641      233
Appendix 5 (Continued): OLS - Estimates 
 
~The Information Content in Profit Warnings and the Implications for Market Rationality~ 
Page 64 
No. Company Alpha Beta Std. Error t-stat Days traded
101 Electromagnetic Geoservices ASA -0,004         0,966          0,042          23,022      245
102 Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA -0,003         0,744          0,027          27,664      233
103 Norsk Hydro ASA 0,001          1,118          0,019          57,389      251
104 Cermaq ASA -0,001         0,809          0,027          30,310      235
105 Protector Forsikring ASA -0,007         0,413          0,034          12,187      106
106 Codfarmers ASA -0,002         0,612          0,041          14,774      165
107 Software Innovation ASA -0,004         0,833          0,045          18,555      148
108 Protector Forsikring ASA -0,004         0,666          0,035          18,950      103
109 ContextVision AB -0,001         0,355          0,029          12,320      125
110 Ignis ASA -0,001         0,925          0,047          19,830      244
111 Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA -0,004         0,614          0,037          16,409      237
112 Kitron ASA -0,001         0,504          0,031          16,222      214
113 Codfarmers ASA -0,004         1,028          0,052          19,877      152
114 Hafslund ASA -0,002         0,722          0,021          33,632      224
115 PSI Group ASA -0,004         0,451          0,043          10,472      229
116 Storebrand ASA -0,002         1,237          0,044          28,431      253
117 Grieg Seafood ASA -0,007         0,319          0,051          6,243        187
118 Cermaq ASA -0,001         0,622          0,035          17,863      235
119 Aker Solutions ASA -0,000         1,567          0,039          40,677      246
120 Norsk Hydro ASA 0,000          1,247          0,028          44,020      249
121 Schibsted ASA -0,001         0,933          0,030          31,143      245
122 Jason Shipping ASA -0,005         0,420          0,046          9,167        222
123 Reservoir Exploration Technology ASA -0,012         0,705          0,054          13,046      211
124 TeleComputing ASA -0,005         0,237          0,043          5,456        150
125 NattoPharma ASA -0,004         0,268          0,070          3,815        215
126 Vizrt Ltd. -0,002         0,375          0,032          11,726      221
127 Veidekke ASA 0,000          0,644          0,032          20,173      233
128 Simtronics ASA 0,001          1,043          0,053          19,863      240
129 FARA ASA -0,000         0,274          0,088          3,112        168
130 Data Respons ASA -0,002         0,487          0,037          13,155      172
131 Odim ASA -0,002         0,978          0,045          21,867      238
132 Codfarmers ASA -0,009         0,691          0,074          9,359        163
133 TTS Group ASA -0,006         0,790          0,056          14,180      219
134 BWG Homes ASA 0,006          0,965          0,038          25,547      221
135 Seadrill Limited 0,001          1,386          0,019          73,299      247
136 TTS Group ASA -0,005         0,624          0,054          11,655      225
137 Veidekke ASA 0,002          0,497          0,022          22,419      222
138 Kitron ASA 0,000          0,477          0,032          14,943      214
139 Wilh. Wilhelmsen Holding ASA 0,001          0,558          0,019          29,183      185
140 Nordic Semiconductor ASA 0,005          1,242          0,037          33,927      235
141 EVRY ASA -0,003         0,757          0,030          25,645      225
142 Eltek ASA -0,001         1,087          0,031          35,237      238
143 Norsk Hydro ASA -0,001         1,343          0,013          101,920     253
144 Q-Free ASA -0,001         0,766          0,024          32,216      216
145 Blom ASA -0,005         0,536          0,041          13,035      247
146 Protector Forsikring ASA 0,002          0,687          0,036          18,933      121
147 SeaBird Exploration PLC -0,003         1,753          0,040          43,872      238
148 EVRY ASA -0,002         0,751          0,031          23,943      217
149 Sølvtrans Holding ASA -0,003         0,315          0,027          11,576      108
150 Protector Forsikring ASA 0,001          0,707          0,036          19,752      123
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151 Yara International ASA 0,000          1,118          0,020          55,785      249
152 Electromagnetic Geoservices ASA 0,003          1,685          0,062          27,037      242
153 Petroleum Geo-Services ASA -0,001         1,771          0,017          103,658     250
154 ORIGIO a/s 0,001          0,393          0,030          13,143      203
155 EVRY ASA -0,001         0,745          0,031          24,356      212
156 Aker Solutions ASA -0,000         1,577          0,017          94,082      251
157 Comrod Communication ASA -0,001         0,483          0,027          18,099      108
158 Petroleum Geo-Services ASA 0,000          1,716          0,015          115,896     249
159 Nordic Semiconductor ASA -0,002         1,171          0,032          36,250      237
160 Aker Solutions ASA -0,001         1,452          0,018          79,469      250
161 Kongsberg Automotive Holding ASA -0,003         1,510          0,024          61,783      246
162 Spectrum ASA 0,001          0,145          0,080          1,797        114
163 Spectrum ASA 0,004          0,486          0,066          7,372        129
164 Birdstep Technology ASA -0,003         0,930          0,070          13,373      190
165 Protector Forsikring ASA -0,000         0,598          0,029          20,308      127
166 Norsk Hydro ASA -0,001         1,382          0,012          115,738     251
167 SeaBird Exploration PLC -0,012         -0,018        0,089          -0,199       205
168 DNO International ASA -0,000         1,130          0,032          34,834      247
169 Blom ASA -0,003         0,960          0,092          10,419      176
170 Bergen Group ASA -0,000         0,398          0,040          9,982        208
171 Jinhui Shipping and Transport. Ltd -0,002         0,737          0,031          24,062      226
172 Vizrt Ltd. 0,001          0,269          0,027          9,878        168
173 Petroleum Geo-Services ASA -0,000         0,229          0,036          6,440        249
174 BW Offshore Limited -0,002         0,452          0,030          14,911      239
175 Bergen Group ASA 0,001          0,288          0,041          6,991        212
176 Odfjell SE -0,003         0,289          0,028          10,476      104
177 Electromagnetic Geoservices ASA -0,000         0,891          0,033          27,249      234
178 Dolphin Group ASA 0,001          0,552          0,031          17,887      227
179 Bergen Group ASA 0,004          0,554          0,037          15,101      203
180 BW Offshore Limited -0,004         0,564          0,027          20,913      236
181 Repant ASA -0,004         1,239          0,057          21,650      171
182 Archer Limited -0,004         0,389          0,037          10,411      241
183 Nordic Semiconductor ASA 0,000          0,522          0,027          19,158      214
184 Scana Industrier ASA -0,001         0,479          0,036          13,300      216
Appendix 5 (Continued): OLS - Estimates 
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No. Company Variance Daily Annual
1 Rieber & Søn ASA 0,000          1,89 % 30,04 %
2 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA 0,001          2,62 % 41,55 %
3 Acergy 0,001          3,15 % 50,05 %
4 Atea ASA 0,002          4,85 % 76,92 %
5 Nordic Semiconductor ASA 0,001          3,00 % 47,54 %
6 Stolt-Nielsen Limited 0,001          2,55 % 40,50 %
7 Jinhui Shipping and Transport 0,005          6,73 % 106,89 %
8 NextGenTel Holding ASA 0,001          2,73 % 43,28 %
9 Technor 0,001          3,41 % 54,20 %
10 Roxar ASA 0,001          2,79 % 44,34 %
11 Atea ASA 0,002          4,88 % 77,40 %
12 Hjellegjerde ASA 0,001          2,46 % 38,98 %
13 Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd. 0,000          1,57 % 24,94 %
14 Agasti Holding ASA 0,001          2,68 % 42,57 %
15 Expert ASA 0,000          1,63 % 25,82 %
16 ContextVision AB 0,002          4,49 % 71,35 %
17 StepStone ASA 0,002          4,96 % 78,78 %
18 Birdstep Technology ASA 0,002          4,13 % 65,50 %
19 Nordic Semiconductor ASA 0,001          3,07 % 48,73 %
20 Tandberg Data ASA 0,001          3,43 % 54,49 %
21 Active 24 0,001          2,71 % 42,96 %
22 Expert ASA 0,000          1,75 % 27,82 %
23 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA 0,001          2,68 % 42,56 %
24 Belships ASA 0,001          3,02 % 48,00 %
25 Tandberg ASA 0,001          2,65 % 42,00 %
26 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA 0,001          2,89 % 45,82 %
27 Blom ASA 0,001          3,73 % 59,24 %
28 Fjord Seafood ASA 0,001          3,33 % 52,92 %
29 Kitron ASA 0,001          2,63 % 41,68 %
30 Agasti Holding ASA 0,001          3,10 % 49,22 %
31 Altinex ASA 0,005          7,10 % 112,67 %
32 Vmetro ASA 0,001          2,86 % 45,32 %
33 Software Innovation ASA 0,001          2,60 % 41,27 %
34 Jason Shipping ASA (CECO ASA) 0,001          2,52 % 40,03 %
35 Tandberg Television ASA 0,001          2,77 % 43,94 %
36 Bionor Pharma ASA 0,004          5,96 % 94,62 %
37 ContextVision AB 0,001          3,12 % 49,50 %
38 Simrad Optronics ASA 0,002          4,01 % 63,59 %
39 Synnøve Finden ASA 0,000          2,20 % 34,94 %
40 Renewable Energy Corporation ASA 0,001          3,60 % 57,08 %
41 Tandberg Data 0,001          2,82 % 44,75 %
42 Acergy S.A 0,001          2,90 % 46,12 %
43 PSI Group ASA 0,001          3,08 % 48,96 %
44 Kverneland ASA 0,001          2,83 % 44,93 %
45 Synnøve Finden ASA 0,000          2,05 % 32,57 %
46 Q-Free ASA 0,001          3,25 % 51,63 %
47 Veidekke ASA 0,000          2,22 % 35,19 %
48 Norsk Hydro ASA 0,001          2,60 % 41,28 %
49 Vmetro ASA 0,001          2,95 % 46,75 %
50 ContextVision AB 0,001          2,42 % 38,46 %
Standard Deviation
Appendix 6: Variance and Standard Deviation  
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No. Company Variance Daily Annual
51 StepStone ASA 0,001          3,34 % 53,05 %
52 Bionor Pharma ASA 0,002          4,27 % 67,82 %
53 Tandberg Storage ASA 0,001          3,18 % 50,55 %
54 OTRUM ASA 0,002          3,91 % 62,01 %
55 Hexagon Composites ASA 0,001          2,63 % 41,67 %
56 Profdoc ASA 0,001          2,53 % 40,09 %
57 Kongsberg Automotive Holding ASA 0,001          2,47 % 39,26 %
58 STX Europe AS 0,001          2,37 % 37,60 %
59 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA 0,001          2,52 % 40,04 %
60 Fast Search & Transfer ASA 0,001          2,53 % 40,24 %
61 Norwegian Property ASA 0,000          1,71 % 27,12 %
62 Exense ASA 0,001          3,32 % 52,76 %
63 Norske Skogindustrier ASA 0,000          1,81 % 28,74 %
64 ContextVision AB 0,001          2,39 % 37,98 %
65 Agasti Holding ASA 0,001          2,34 % 37,21 %
66 StepStone ASA 0,001          2,53 % 40,08 %
67 TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Company ASA 0,001          2,47 % 39,17 %
68 DNB ASA 0,000          1,36 % 21,61 %
69 Software Innovation ASA 0,001          2,96 % 47,04 %
70 Marine Harvest ASA 0,001          2,30 % 36,45 %
71 Renewable Energy Corporation ASA 0,001          2,82 % 44,72 %
72 OTRUM ASA 0,001          3,31 % 52,61 %
73 Ekornes ASA 0,000          1,80 % 28,53 %
74 Acergy A.S 0,000          2,15 % 34,05 %
75 Norske Skogindustrier ASA 0,001          2,69 % 42,74 %
76 STX Europe AS 0,001          2,56 % 40,58 %
77 Tandberg Data ASA 0,002          4,56 % 72,43 %
78 Veidekke ASA 0,001          3,00 % 47,58 %
79 Bluewater Insurance ASA 0,001          3,39 % 53,83 %
80 Agasti Holding ASA 0,001          3,10 % 49,25 %
81 StepStone ASA 0,001          2,77 % 43,89 %
82 Cermaq ASA 0,001          2,89 % 45,84 %
83 Schibsted ASA 0,001          2,34 % 37,15 %
84 Kitron ASA 0,001          2,27 % 36,08 %
85 Petroleum Geo-Services ASA 0,001          2,63 % 41,70 %
86 Faktor Eiendom ASA 0,002          4,73 % 75,03 %
87 OTRUM ASA 0,001          3,68 % 58,45 %
88 Hexagon Composites ASA 0,001          2,55 % 40,43 %
89 Roxar ASA 0,001          2,33 % 36,96 %
90 SeaBird Exploration PLC 0,002          4,04 % 64,12 %
91 Norske Skogindustrier ASA 0,001          3,79 % 60,20 %
92 Wintershall Norge ASA 0,001          2,63 % 41,73 %
93 Navamedic ASA 0,001          2,88 % 45,68 %
94 Wavefield Inseis ASA 0,001          3,21 % 51,00 %
95 Cermaq ASA 0,001          2,95 % 46,90 %
96 Roxar ASA 0,001          2,39 % 37,96 %
97 TECO Maritime ASA 0,001          2,32 % 36,88 %
98 Kitron ASA 0,001          2,61 % 41,44 %
99 Axis-Shield plc 0,001          2,36 % 37,45 %
100 Songa Offshore SE 0,001          2,25 % 35,76 %
Standard Deviation
Appendix 6 (Continued): Variance and Standard Deviation 
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101 Electromagnetic Geoservices ASA 0,002          4,44 % 70,53 %
102 Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA 0,001          2,93 % 46,46 %
103 Norsk Hydro ASA 0,001          2,63 % 41,72 %
104 Cermaq ASA 0,001          2,96 % 46,98 %
105 Protector Forsikring ASA 0,001          3,44 % 54,58 %
106 Codfarmers ASA 0,002          4,25 % 67,50 %
107 Software Innovation ASA 0,002          4,70 % 74,54 %
108 Protector Forsikring ASA 0,001          3,67 % 58,21 %
109 ContextVision AB 0,001          2,98 % 47,23 %
110 Ignis ASA 0,003          5,09 % 80,80 %
111 Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA 0,002          3,99 % 63,27 %
112 Kitron ASA 0,001          3,33 % 52,91 %
113 Codfarmers ASA 0,003          5,77 % 91,67 %
114 Hafslund ASA 0,001          2,83 % 44,95 %
115 PSI Group ASA 0,002          4,51 % 71,63 %
116 Storebrand ASA 0,003          5,67 % 90,03 %
117 Grieg Seafood ASA 0,003          5,19 % 82,42 %
118 Cermaq ASA 0,002          3,96 % 62,92 %
119 Aker Solutions ASA 0,004          6,12 % 97,20 %
120 Norsk Hydro ASA 0,002          4,68 % 74,26 %
121 Schibsted ASA 0,002          4,08 % 64,75 %
122 Jason Shipping ASA 0,002          4,74 % 75,32 %
123 Reservoir Exploration Technology ASA 0,003          5,82 % 92,44 %
124 TeleComputing ASA 0,002          4,39 % 69,72 %
125 NattoPharma ASA 0,005          7,07 % 112,20 %
126 Vizrt Ltd. 0,001          3,40 % 53,92 %
127 Veidekke ASA 0,001          3,80 % 60,34 %
128 Simtronics ASA 0,004          6,21 % 98,58 %
129 FARA ASA 0,008          8,83 % 140,24 %
130 Data Respons ASA 0,002          4,04 % 64,17 %
131 Odim ASA 0,003          5,48 % 87,03 %
132 Codfarmers ASA 0,006          7,73 % 122,64 %
133 TTS Group ASA 0,004          5,92 % 93,98 %
134 BWG Homes ASA 0,002          4,19 % 66,55 %
135 Seadrill Limited 0,001          3,24 % 51,45 %
136 TTS Group ASA 0,003          5,47 % 86,82 %
137 Veidekke ASA 0,001          2,40 % 38,15 %
138 Kitron ASA 0,001          3,29 % 52,30 %
139 Wilh. Wilhelmsen Holding ASA 0,000          2,09 % 33,25 %
140 Nordic Semiconductor ASA 0,002          4,09 % 64,94 %
141 EVRY ASA 0,001          3,15 % 49,96 %
142 Eltek ASA 0,001          3,45 % 54,83 %
143 Norsk Hydro ASA 0,001          2,31 % 36,73 %
144 Q-Free ASA 0,001          2,62 % 41,54 %
145 Blom ASA 0,002          4,16 % 66,11 %
146 Protector Forsikring ASA 0,001          3,74 % 59,42 %
147 SeaBird Exploration PLC 0,002          4,64 % 73,59 %
148 EVRY ASA 0,001          3,30 % 52,35 %
149 Sølvtrans Holding ASA 0,001          2,74 % 43,56 %
150 Protector Forsikring ASA 0,001          3,70 % 58,68 %
Standard Deviation
Appendix 6 (Continued): Variance and Standard Deviation 
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151 Yara International ASA 0,001          2,50 % 39,73 %
152 Electromagnetic Geoservices ASA 0,004          6,62 % 105,10 %
153 Petroleum Geo-Services ASA 0,001          2,85 % 45,32 %
154 ORIGIO a/s 0,001          3,03 % 48,10 %
155 EVRY ASA 0,001          3,18 % 50,55 %
156 Aker Solutions ASA 0,001          2,41 % 38,20 %
157 Comrod Communication ASA 0,001          2,72 % 43,15 %
158 Petroleum Geo-Services ASA 0,001          2,28 % 36,27 %
159 Nordic Semiconductor ASA 0,001          3,52 % 55,88 %
160 Aker Solutions ASA 0,001          2,71 % 43,05 %
161 Kongsberg Automotive Holding ASA 0,001          3,25 % 51,55 %
162 Spectrum ASA 0,006          8,01 % 127,23 %
163 Spectrum ASA 0,004          6,60 % 104,81 %
164 Birdstep Technology ASA 0,005          7,08 % 112,42 %
165 Protector Forsikring ASA 0,001          3,11 % 49,33 %
166 Norsk Hydro ASA 0,001          2,45 % 38,92 %
167 SeaBird Exploration PLC 0,008          8,89 % 141,19 %
168 DNO International ASA 0,001          3,67 % 58,25 %
169 Blom ASA 0,009          9,30 % 147,62 %
170 Bergen Group ASA 0,002          4,02 % 63,82 %
171 Jinhui Shipping and Transport. Ltd 0,001          3,28 % 51,99 %
172 Vizrt Ltd. 0,001          2,75 % 43,70 %
173 Petroleum Geo-Services ASA 0,001          3,58 % 56,76 %
174 BW Offshore Limited 0,001          3,11 % 49,36 %
175 Bergen Group ASA 0,002          4,13 % 65,53 %
176 Odfjell SE 0,001          2,77 % 43,96 %
177 Electromagnetic Geoservices ASA 0,001          3,46 % 54,90 %
178 Dolphin Group ASA 0,001          3,15 % 50,02 %
179 Bergen Group ASA 0,001          3,73 % 59,17 %
180 BW Offshore Limited 0,001          2,77 % 44,00 %
181 Repant ASA 0,003          5,90 % 93,70 %
182 Archer Limited 0,001          3,76 % 59,69 %
183 Nordic Semiconductor ASA 0,001          2,78 % 44,13 %
184 Scana Industrier ASA 0,001          3,63 % 57,59 %
Average total sample: 0,001        3,53 % 56,04 %
Average 2005 0,001          3,19 % 50,69 %
Average 2006 0,001          3,30 % 52,46 %
Average 2007 0,001          2,71 % 42,94 %
Average 2008 0,001          3,35 % 53,18 %
Average 2009 0,003          5,38 % 85,42 %
Average 2010 0,001          3,40 % 54,01 %
Average 2011 0,002          3,59 % 57,02 %
Average 2012 0,002          4,27 % 67,77 %
Standard Deviation
Appendix 6 (Continued): Variance and Standard Deviation 
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1 Introduction 
Traditional studies on earnings announcements and market efficiency has focused 
on the relationship between earnings information and stock prices, while studies 
concerning profit warnings have been less explored. Expectations about future 
cash flows are one of the drivers of a company’s share price; hence rational 
investors ought to incorporate the information in profit warnings into new 
estimates of the market value. Because profit warnings are pure information 
events and the reaction from the market is large, it is an opportunity to test market 
efficiency and the information content in the warnings. This paper will examine 
profit warnings disclosed by Norwegian listed companies and test whether there 
exists abnormal returns ex-ante and ex-post. An event study on profit warnings 
disclosed from 01.01.05 until 31.12.12 is conducted to test the speed of 
adjustment of the new information and the reaction by the market. Bulkley and 
Herrerias (2005) classified profit warnings into two differing classes and this 
approach will be pursued and implemented in this thesis. They distinguished 
between new information that included earnings forecasts (quantitative) and new 
information that only included guidance for which direction earnings would 
deviate from previous forecasts (qualitative). This gives insight into the degree of 
disclosed information in the profit warning and its effect on stock returns. Based 
on this interest, the following research question has been developed:  
 
To what extent does the Norwegian stock market react to profit warnings and how 
fast does it adjust to the new information?  
 
Although some research on profit warnings in Norway exists (Svendsen 2009; 
Larsen M. and Jacobsen E. 2005; Kleppan, Hjelmeseth and Nysveen 2002), it is a 
relatively new subject given that profit warnings had not been regulated until 
1999, when listed companies became obliged to notify their shareholders if the 
company was aware of significant deviations from previous earnings statements 
(Oslo Børs 1999). This law has later been repealed and profit warnings are 
therefore regulated by the general rule regarding disclosure of inside information 
(Oslo Børs (1) 2005; Oslo Børs (2) 2005). The authors of this paper are not aware 
of any research within the Norwegian field that examines the degree of disclosed 
~The Information Content in Profit Warnings and the Implications for Market Rationality~ 
Page 74 
information and how it affects share price movements. Our thesis contributes with 
updated data and takes previous research one step further by distinguishing 
between different profit warnings for Norwegian listed companies.  
 
1.1 Structure 
This paper is structured into seven sections including the introduction. The second 
section covers relevant background information concerning profit warnings and 
efficient market theory. Profit warnings are defined and the purpose of these 
statements is clarified. The rationale behind an efficient market and its implication 
on security prices is also enlightened in this section.  The third section reviews 
published literature and previous research on topics that are relevant for this 
master thesis. Of special importance is the article “Does the Precision of News 
Affect Market Underreaction” by Bulkley and Herrerias (2005), due to the fact 
that it investigates some of the same topics and applies similar methods as will be 
employed in this thesis. Furthermore, this section is divided into four subsections, 
namely profit warnings and market efficiency, information leakage, post-earnings-
announcement price drift and event studies. The fourth section describes the 
methodology used in the research and reasoning behind the choice of asset pricing 
model, besides addressing the length of the event window and statistical- and 
econometric assumptions. In section five a description of the data and how it is 
extracted is provided. The results will be presented and interpreted in the sixth 
section. Finally the seventh section will conclude and sum up the findings. Here it 
will be elaborated on the impact the results have on the Norwegian stock market, 
before the weaknesses with this study and suggestions for future research is 
proposed.  
 
1.2 Hypothesis testing 
In order to test whether the Norwegian stock market respond in accordance with 
the efficient market hypothesis, four different hypotheses are constructed. The 
implications of the hypothesis analysis are also discussed briefly. 
 
H01: There are no abnormal returns on the announcement date 
HA1: There are abnormal returns on the announcement date 
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When new information which deviates from forecasts is released, rational 
investors are expected to act on the new information. It is therefore presumed that 
evidence of abnormal returns will be found at the announcement date. A violation 
of the second null-hypothesis indicates that the market is not strong-form 
efficient. 
 
H02: There is no information leakage prior to the announcement date 
HA2: There is information leakage prior to the announcement date 
 
The second hypothesis considers the timing of when information is released. In a 
perfect efficient stock market, news will be perceived by all investors 
simultaneously and the reaction to a profit warning will cause a jump in the 
security price. A rejection of H02 indicates that some investors gain access to the 
information earlier than others, or that they interpret and react quicker than the 
rest of the market. A violation of the null-hypothesis could be a result of an 
inefficient market. 
 
H03: There are no abnormal returns in the stock market following a profit 
warning 
HA3: There are abnormal returns in the stock market following a profit 
warning 
 
If investors can gain systematic abnormal returns through trading strategies after 
the announcement date, then the market is not semi-strong efficient. Significant 
evidence of abnormal returns in retrospect is called post-announcement drift and 
could be both positive and negative. This hypothesis is testing for both 
underreaction and overreaction in the stock market.  
 
H04: The degree of informational disclosure does not impact the price 
volatility of security prices 
HA4: The degree of informational disclosure does impact the price volatility 
of security prices 
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The last hypothesis considers the information content in the profit warnings. It is 
tested for whether quantitative or qualitative warnings have a larger impact than 
the other. If differences are detected, it is expected that quantitative warnings 
leads to a lower reaction in the stock market than qualitative. The basis for this 
assertion is that prior research has found that investors tend to overact to 
qualitative profit warnings, and that share prices adjust to equilibrium faster when 
forecasts are provided, due to the increased knowledge among shareholders. 
 
2 Background Information 
In this section an overview of relevant theory related to the research question is 
provided. The research performed in this paper is anchored in these models and 
publications. 
Profit warnings are statements proclaimed by a firm due to unexpected changes in 
the company’s financial results.  These announcements are published to inform 
investors and stakeholders about the firms operating performance and to alert 
about deviations from forecasted results. Bulkley & Herrerias (2004) define a 
profit warning as unexpected corporate announcement which declare that future 
earnings will decrease below current expectations. The content and scope of the 
profit warnings varies widely, where some warnings only states that performance 
will be lower or better than expected, while others provides more detailed and 
accurate forecasts. Profit warnings are similar to earning announcements in terms 
of disclosing information, although profit warnings generally are considered to be 
less anticipated and thereby cause larger fluctuations in stock prices (Church and 
Donker 2010).  
 
2.1 Market efficiency  
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is the notion that security prices reflect all 
available information, where the market price is considered to be an unbiased 
estimate of the true value of the investment (Fama 1965). The theory concerning 
market efficiency is consistent with Maurice Kendall’s research, which discovered 
that stock prices seemed to follow a random walk (Kendall M. 1953). The concept 
that stock prices follow a random walk implies that price changes are independent 
of each other, and that no systematic patterns exist (Brealey, Myers and Allen 
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2008).  If systematic patterns could be detected, investors would exploit them and 
thereby eliminate them through extensive trading. Samuelson argued in the 
following way: “In competitive markets there is a buyer for every seller. If one 
could be sure that a price would rise, it would have already risen” (Samuelson 
1965). If the EMH holds, future market prices should be unpredictable and only 
unexpected news will affect the price level. Deviations from market efficiency 
could lead to inefficient resource allocation, a cost borne by all citizens in a 
society (Mendes 2010). 
 
Eugene Fama defined three forms of market efficiency and his work has been 
prevalent thereafter (Bodie, Kane and Markus 2011; Fama 1970): 
 Weak form assumes that current stock prices reflect all information that 
can be derived from historical prices and by examining market trading 
data. The implication is that trading strategies based on chartism and trend 
analysis is not profitable 
 Semi-strong form defines a market as efficient if all public available 
information is incorporated into the stock price. Persistent anomalies and 
predictions of future abnormal returns would be violating the semi-strong 
efficiency. 
 Strong form states that prices reflect all relevant information, even 
including inside information. This hypothesis is extreme and implies full 
transparency within the market, as no company insiders can pre-empt the 
market or take advantage of information asymmetries.  
The semi-strong form is of particular interest when testing for market efficiency 
regarding profit warnings announcements. If the semi-strong efficiency hypothesis 
holds, market prices will adjust immediately after the announcement in response 
to the new information, and no post-announcement price drift will occur. The 
stock price jumps to the new price level and investors’ opportunity to act faster 
than the market is limited. In fact Patell and Wolfson (1984) ascertain that most of 
the market response to dividend or earning announcements occurs within the first 
10 minutes after the notice (Patell and Wolfson 1984). Post-announcement price 
drift indicates an underreaction if the price continue to fall in a longer time period 
beyond a negative warning (Bernard 1993). If the security price reverses some of 
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the initial movement, then the market may have overreacted to the announcement. 
A stock price reversal does not necessarily entail an overreaction, rather signalize 
that market risk premium varies over time and only be a rational response to 
changes in discount rates (Bodie, Kane and Marcus 2011).  
 
If information was gathered at different times, it could be evidence against market 
efficiency, due to leakage in the market. On the other hand it could also reflect the 
fact that news in profit warnings may be anticipated by the market before the 
announcement date; hence some adjustments could already be incorporated into 
the share price (Jackson and Madura 2003). Investors have several sources they 
acquire information from, thus information leakage prior to the announcement 
date does not necessarily mean that the semi-strong market efficiency is violated. 
Changes in security prices could also be caused by external factors. In order to 
deal with this issue, the effect from the announcement needs to be distinguished 
from the price movements caused by general market factors. 
 
Acquiring detailed information for individual companies are time consuming and 
costly. Investors are only willing to actively collect additional information if they 
are compensated for the added effort through higher returns (Grossman and 
Stiglitz 1980). Active investment strategies for common shareholders are costly 
due to the low percentage gain from extensive information seeking. Mutual funds 
can pool interests together and gain from economies of scale which gives them a 
greater incentive to find mispriced stocks. An efficient market will allow for 
abnormal returns to compensate the ones who put in additional resources, but only 
enough to provide superior gross returns and average net returns (Markiel 1989). 
Transaction costs and illiquidity are factors which make it harder to gain from 
mispriced stocks. When evaluating whether the market is inefficient or not, these 
factors must be taken into consideration. Furthermore, a mispriced security can 
use a long time to return back to equilibrium, thus arbitrage is challenging and tie 
up capital.   
 
Abnormal returns are defined as actual returns less expected returns implied by 
the asset pricing model. Presence of abnormal returns around events is not 
necessarily a violation of the efficient market hypothesis, but it is a violation if 
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these abnormal returns persist over time and not are random. In an efficient 
market, security prices out of equilibrium should converge towards its true value 
and there should be equal probability for whether a stock is over- or undervalued. 
 
2.2 Joint hypothesis problem 
When you perform a test for whether a market is efficient, you are implicitly 
testing the assumptions the asset pricing model is based on (Brealey, Myers and 
Allen 2008). Any test of market efficiency is consequently also a test for whether 
the capital asset pricing model is correct. This is called the Joint hypothesis 
problem. If efficiency is rejected, it could be because the market is truly 
inefficient or because an incorrect equilibrium model has been assumed 
(Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay 1997). The implication of this theorem is that 
caution has to be taken when inferences are drawn about market efficiency. 
Richard Roll does moreover point out that the market portfolio is unobservable 
and impossible to precisely estimate, because it does not include every single asset 
available (Roll, 1977). 
 
3 Literature Review 
3.1 Literature about event studies  
Profit warnings are pure information events, which make them well suited for 
event studies. An event study is a technique in empirical financial research that 
can measure the impact of a specific event on the value of a firm. Given 
rationality in the marketplace the impact can be deducted since the effects of an 
event should immediately be reflected in the security prices (MacKinlay, Craig. 
1997). One of the first event studies was performed by James Dolley and it 
explored the procedure of common stock split-ups (Dolley 1933). One of the main 
findings was that prices increased more than they declined following a stock split.  
The first event studies suffered from several drawbacks, as they failed to separate 
general stock market price movements from the effect caused by the event, but 
these elements were gradually improved during the next three decades 
(MacKinlay 1997). The methodology applied in Ball and Brown and Fama’s 
groundbreaking studies in the 1960’s is still practiced, although some 
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modifications have been introduced, mainly to comprehend with violation of 
statistical assumptions (Brown and Warner 1980 and 1985). 
 
3.2 Literature about profit warnings and market efficiency 
One of the first studies to empirically test whether stock returns respond to release 
of new information to the market was Ray Ball and Philip Brown in 1968. They 
performed an event study of earning announcements for 261 firms over the period 
1957 to 1965 and measured whether reported earnings were greater or lower than 
what the market expected, with last year’s actual earnings as a proxy for the 
market expectations (Ball and Brown 1968; Scott 2012). The firms that reported 
good news experienced abnormal returns relative to the market of 6% in the 
period leading up to the earnings release, while firms that reported bad news 
underperformed relative to the market with 9%. The interesting feature with this 
study was the accumulation of abnormal return prior to the event date and Ball 
and Brown (1968) concluded that the earnings report is not a medium that can be 
considered as very timely.  
 
Kasznik and Lev (1995) examined the actions of the management prior to a large 
earnings surprise. Their focus was on how the management disclosed this 
information and how the investors reacted to this. They found that the likelihood 
of issuing a warning was positively associated with firm size, existence of 
previous forecasts and relationship to the high technology industry. Another 
finding was a higher tendency to disclose warnings relating to permanent earnings 
disappointments than transitory, which is also what the investors appear to be 
concerned about. Their study also questioned why not more companies disclosed 
disappointing earnings announcement because of its’ beneficiary sides, e.g. 
deterring litigation and reducing transaction costs. A possible explanation could 
be the fear of a negative impact caused by overreaction among investors, which 
outweighs the benefits of disclosing earnings surprises. Another study written by 
Skinner (1994) found evidence of voluntary disclosure of bad news before 
earnings announcement, due to the threat of large stock declines. Managers face 
an asymmetric loss function when deciding on disclosure policy, due to the fear of 
litigation and reputational costs. Skinner (1994) also reported that bad news was 
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likely to be qualitative statements about the current quarter’s earnings, while good 
news tended to be point range or estimates of annual-EPS.     
 
A study which is of special interest to our thesis is written by Bulkley and 
Herrerias (2005). They found significant negative abnormal returns the three 
months following a profit warning. This gives an indication that the market 
underreacts to the new information and that the market is slow to respond. A 
special feature in this study is the distinction between profit warnings that 
included a new forecast (quantitative) and profit warnings that only offered 
guidance about earnings below market expectation. This classification makes it 
possible to test the precision of a news release and whether it has an effect on the 
size of the underreaction (Bulkley and Herrerias 2005).    
 
3.3 Research on information leakage 
Evidence of information leakage diverge somewhat, but several researchers 
submit evidence of information leakage prior to an event. Keown and Pinkerton 
(1981) provided significant confirmation of informational leakage as far as 12 
trading days prior to merger announcements. Jackson and Madura (2003) detect 
information leakage before profit warnings, where they document a negative 
abnormal return of 2.38 percent on average, by applying a four-day window prior 
to the announcement date. Helbok and Walker (2003) report that evidence of 
informed trading prior to the release of profit warnings in the UK, does not exist 
after the companies were obliged to disclose information in the UK. The fact that 
pre-announcement drift has been documented could be a violation of the semi-
strong market efficient hypothesis, and indicates that some insiders can earn 
abnormal returns. 
 
3.4 Literature about post-earnings-announcement price drift 
When new information is released the efficient market hypothesis states that 
prices should reflect this immediately. Event studies are therefore a way to 
examine whether markets are efficient or not, since causation from a specific 
event may be deducted. Jones, Latanè and Rendleman (1982) used the same 
method as Ball and Brown (1968) to rank and divide the firms into 10 deciles 
based on the size of the earnings surprise, and then calculate the cumulative 
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abnormal return (CAR) for each decile. They found that the companies with the 
largest positive surprise experienced continuing CAR, while the companies with 
negative CAR at t=0 experienced a declining CAR. Jones, Latanè and Rendleman 
(1982) explained this with a gradual response to earnings announcements, but 
since this pattern is predictable it violates the theory about efficient markets 
(Bodie, Kane and Marcus 2011). This anomaly is known as post-earnings-
announcement price drift which Bernard and Thomas (1990) later confirmed in 
their paper “Evidence That Stock Prices Do Not Fully Reflect the Implications of 
Current Earnings for Future Earnings” (Bodie, Kane and Marcus 2011). They 
found evidence of slow market reaction to new information and that the signs and 
magnitude of the slow reaction was related to the autocorrelation structure of 
earnings. The predictability of future earnings due to autocorrelation in the 
residuals is evidence of market failure, i.e. market inefficiency (Bernard, V and 
Thomas, J. 1990).  
 
4 Methodology 
The methodology used in this thesis will be based on the pioneering method used 
by Ball and Brown (1968) and the research of Bulkley and Herrerias (2005). They 
separated between qualitative and quantitative profit warnings, and this section 
will explain the underlying features of our research and how we intend to carry it 
out. 
 
4.1 Event Window 
The event window is determined to be greater than the specific event of interest, 
since we prefer to examine the market reaction to the profit warnings measured by 
the level of abnormal returns. Hence, our event window is [-10, 1, +10], i.e. 21 
days. A longer event window will also be examined, but the length of this window 
will still be shorter than one year to secure that errors in risk-adjustment still are 
mitigated (Kothari and Warner 2004). The length of the large window is [-10, 1, + 
90], and will capture post-profit warning effects. Investigating a longer window 
allows us to study whether any momentum and reversal effects exist. Our two 
event windows are therefore 21 days and 101 days respectively.  
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4.2 The Market Model 
This subsection provides a discussion about the choice of asset pricing model and 
the methodology used to calculate abnormal returns, such that possible impacts of 
profit warnings can be deducted. An essential aspect of event studies is the 
measurement of abnormal returns, since presence of such abnormal returns 
suggests that the market is inefficient i.e. an arbitrage opportunity exists 
(MacKinlay 1997). An asset pricing model to estimate the expected returns is 
required in order to calculate abnormal returns. We decided to use the market 
model, which assumes a stable linear relation between the security’s return and 
the market return (Copeland, Weston and Shastri 2005). The underlying 
assumptions in the market model are purely statistical as it is not an economic 
model. Therefore the assets returns are jointly multivariate normal, in addition to 
independently and identically distributed, i.d.d., through time. These are 
distributional assumptions which make the market model correctly specified 
(MacKinlay 1997). The reason for why this model is elected is based on the large 
impact a profit warning has on the return on the day of the event, and a more 
advanced model will consequently not improve the explanatory power that much.  
 
MacKinlay (1997) argues that the market model is superior to the constant mean 
return model since the variance of the abnormal return is reduced, which in turn 
increases the ability to detect effects of e.g. profit warnings. The reason why the 
market model is an improvement is because the return that is related to variation 
in the market return is removed, which increases the opportunity to detect effects 
of an event (MacKinlay 1997). He also argues that the gains from introducing 
multifactor models for event studies are limited, because introducing additional 
factors with low explanatory power not necessarily reduce the variance of the 
abnormal return.   
 
The equation below shows the linear relationship between return for security i, 
E(Ri,t), and the return on the market portfolio, Rm. OLS is used to minimize the 
sum of the squared residuals and to find the OLS-estimators that fits the straight 
line best.  
 
                            (1)  
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E(εi,t = 0) is the zero mean disturbance term  
Var(εi,t) = σi,t
2  is the variance of the disturbance term 
 
The parameters  ,    and σ are estimated with equation (1) over the estimation 
window, L1, which excludes the event window. The event window is excluded to 
avoid that the particular event of interest influence the parameters (MacKinlay 
1997). The event window, T2 – T1, is greater than the specific event of interest, in 
order to capture the entire effect of the profit warning.   
 
 
Figure 1 
 
By estimating α and β you are able to calculate the expected return for the event 
window because of the linear relation between βi,t and Rm,t. Before abnormal 
returns can be defined the actual returns needs to be calculated for each day in the 
entire event window, L2 = T2 – T1. Equation (2) gives the log returns in L2. The 
reason for using log returns is that it conforms better to the normality assumptions 
in the regression, and because the transformation makes it easier to convert daily 
returns to weekly or monthly.   
 
    (2) 
 
 
ARi,τ = Ri, τ –   i –   iRm,τ         (3) 
 
ARi,τ = Ri, τ –     i, τ 
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ARi,τ are therefore equivalent to the difference between the return conditional on 
the event, Ri,τ, and the expected return unconditional on the event, – (α +βiRm,τ), 
(MacKinlay 1997).  
 
4.3 Aggregating abnormal return  
The next step is to aggregate the abnormal returns over time and across the 
securities in the sample. The two event windows consist of 21 days and 101 days, 
which are represented in figure 1 with the T1 to T2. The cumulative abnormal 
returns for each security will be aggregated over time using equation (4) below.  
   
    (4) 
 
 
Since this is the CAR for only one event, the aggregated CAR for all event 
observations need to be aggregated before final inferences can be made. The 
dataset must be controlled for clustering before cross-sectional aggregating. 
Clustering is the overlap of profit warnings in the event window, which may bias 
the result of an event. The reason why clustering may bias a conclusion is the non-
zero covariance between the clustered abnormal returns. The case of clustering 
will be addressed later. If no clustering of events exists, then the individual 
abnormal returns from equation (3) can be aggregated for each event. With N 
events the sample aggregated abnormal returns are calculated using equation (5).  
 
        (5) 
 
These average abnormal returns can then be aggregated in the same manner as in 
equation (4), which captures the total effect of the profit warning for the entire 
event period.  
 
    (6) 
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4.4 Information disclosure 
In order to examine whether the degree of disclosure influence how investors’ 
respond to a profit warning, a dummy variable is introduced. The variable take 
value 0 if the announcement only provides news about the direction of deviations 
from forecasted results, while the dummy variable equals 1 if the company 
provides an estimate of how large the deviations are. The precision of the news is 
analyzed by assessing each profit warning manually, but the quality of the 
forecasts and level of details disclosed are not distinguished by the authors of this 
paper due to the subjectivity. However, it is expected to find lower abnormal 
returns for the warnings that provide qualitative information than the ones that 
only contribute with qualitative information. This is consistent with the efficient 
market hypothesis, which claims that the more informed the investors are, the 
quicker the market will correct mispricing.  
 
4.5 Significance tests of abnormal returns 
In this subsection we will cover potential pitfalls associated with event studies and 
the test of significance for abnormal returns. Assessing these issues is important 
before any statistical inference can be drawn from the results. First we will 
employ various significance tests of the abnormal returns to make sure that the 
model is correctly specified, and that no additional modifications of the model are 
needed. If the model is not able to distinguish between the null hypothesis and 
economically interesting alternatives there is a need for modification of the model 
design (MacKinlay 1997).  
 
4.5.1 Test of Significance 
A two sided test of the cumulative abnormal returns from equation (6) will be 
tested for significance to address whether the null hypothesis can be rejected or 
not. The test is two-sided since abnormal returns can be negative or positive. 
Parametric tests will be used in this study since previous research has found non-
parametric tests to be unnecessary complicated and not well-performing 
(Henderson 2002).  Imprecise predictions about the securities’ unconditional 
expected return and a component of the realized return on the event day, which 
are not attributable to the event itself, are two reasons why abnormal returns are 
measured with error (Kothari and Warner 2004).  
~The Information Content in Profit Warnings and the Implications for Market Rationality~ 
Page 87 
4.5.2 Econometric Problems 
In this subsection concerns about econometric problems will be addressed. The 
daily security returns will be checked for normality and cross-sectional serial 
correlation. Financial events are often associated with variance shifts that may 
influence the power of the test and specification of the model. Another factor to 
concider is the correlation between the security returns’ residuals, εit, and the 
return on the market portfolio, Rmt. Presence of such correlation will bias the 
expected return of the securities, Rit, and cause a misspecification of the model 
(Henderson 2002). A final issue to reflect on is the presence of event clustering, 
which in this case is overlapping profit warnings. If such events overlap, then the 
covariance between the securities will be different from zero. This will distort the 
distributional results for the aggregated abnormal returns (MacKinlay 1997). In 
order to deal with this issue an alternative is to analyze the abnormal returns 
before the aggregation, and consider a test with a null hypothesis of the event 
having no impact using non-aggregated data. This is a method used if there is 
presence of large clustering, i.e. many profit warnings on the same date. The 
drawback of this approach is the low sample properties of the test statistics and 
the test will often have little power against economically reasonable alternatives 
(MacKinlay 1997; Bernard 1987). 
 
5 Data 
In this section an overview of the data and the data collection process is presented. 
How profit warnings, parameters and market returns are retrieved will be 
explained and sources of error in the dataset will be discussed.  
 
5.1 Profit warnings 
The first step in the data collection process is to define the date of the event, i.e. 
the announcement date of the profit warning. This date sets the pre-conditions for 
estimation of α and β during the estimation window which later is employed for 
the expected returns in the event window. Each individual profit warning, and 
hence date, is retrieved from notifications that listed companies has submitted to 
Oslo Stock Exchange. Processing each submitted notification to assess whether it 
is a profit warning or not is necessary. This will be a time consuming process and 
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can be a source of error in our dataset, but a necessity due to the lack of existing 
alternatives.  
 
5.2 Estimation window 
The choice of estimation period for estimating    and    depends on the data 
availability and the specific event. In this paper an estimation window prior to the 
event is used, which starts 261 days before the day of the event and ends eleven 
days prior to the profit warning; hence, L1 = T1 – T0 = 250 days, see figure 1. The 
length of L1 has an impact on the conditional variance of the abnormal returns, 
σ2(ARiτ), due to the additional variance that stems from the sampling error in αi 
and βi. Using a larger estimation window with more observations causes the 
additional variance to approach zero, due to a reduced sampling error of the 
parameters (MacKinlay 1997).    
 
5.3 Market portfolio 
Oslo Stock Exchange All-Share Index, OSEAX, has been chosen as a proxy for 
the market portfolio. This index consists of all the listed companies on OSE and is 
adjusted for dividend payments.    
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